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FORWARD INTO THE PAST: PRODUCTIVITY RETROGRESSION
IN THE ELECTRIC GENERATING INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
The electric utility industry is a prime culprit in the U.S. productivity growth slowdown of the
last two decades. This paper develops econometric labor and fuel demand equations for a large panel
data set covering almost ail fossil-fueled electric generating capacity over the period 1948-87. Labor
productivity and fuel efficiency both advanced rapidly until the late 1960s and then both reversed
direction, deteriorating substantially, particularly for newly constructed plants.
The research goes beyond econometric estimation by conducting a set of telephone interviews
with plant managers of establishments that registered particulariy high or low productivity. The
interviews reveal many variables and relations that are omitted in conventional econometric studies of
production. They support the view that the productivity reversal originated in the manufacturing
industry that produces electric generating equipment; after decades of increased scale, temperature, and
pressure, a "technological frontier" was reached in which new large plants developed unanticipated
maintenance problems requiring substantial additions of maintenance employees. Environmental
regulations also contributed to the productivity reversal but were secondary in importance to the
technological barriers. Overall, the study supports the "depletion hypothesis' previously advanced to
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Date I. INTRODUCTION
12/91 The worldwide slowdown in productivity growth since the early 1970s has continued
to puzzle economists. The failure to identi' any convincing single cause has led to a shift
in research away from aggregate studies toward more detailed research at the industry
level.1 Along with construction and mining, the electric utility industry is one of three U. S.
12/91 industries that have suffered the sharpest deceleration of productivity growth and thus is a
natural candidate for detailed study.
Three special advantages commend the electric utility industry for analysis. First, its
12/91 output is unusually hornogenous, thus minimizing the usual problem of errors in measuring
output. Second, as a regulated industry, the production process of electric utility generation
is documented in an unusually detailed body of micro data at the establishment level.
Third, electric utilities should be a fertile ground to test several of the most prominent
12/91 single-cause theories of the aggregate productivity slowdown, including those that emphasize
the role of energy prices, capital accumulation, environmental regulation, and the "depletion"
of technology.
12/91 This paper provides new estimates of factor demand equations for labor and fuel use
at the establishment level for fossil-fueled steam-electric generating plants, using a data set
that has been newly developed for this study. It attempts to link the results to three strands
of literature that have developed largely in isolation, (1) the macro-oriented literature on






1. Among the single-cause explanations for the aggregate economy are higher energy prices (Rasche-Tatom,
1981), high raw materials prices (Bruno-Sachs, 1985), slower capital accumulation (Norsworthy, Harper, Kunze,
1979), a decline in capital services relative to the measured capital stock (Baily, 1981), and depletion of
resources and ideas (Nordhaus, 1980, 1982). Others, including Edward Denizen (1985), tend to attribute the
slowdown to a multitude of causes.
3939 David H. Good The Structure of Production. Technical Change 12/91
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12/91utility and environmental regulation, and (3) the econometric literature on production
technology and factor demand in the electric utility industry.
Standard econometric methodology is used except in one respect, the treatment of
outlier observations.Unlike most panel data sets in which the identity of individual
observations is unknown, here it is possible to contact plant managers of individual outlier
establishments and identify important determinants of input demand, thus illuminating the
role of missing variables or mismeasured data. The sulnlnaly of the telephone interviews
represents an important contribution of the research and adds insight that cannot be
provided by the ecönometric coefficient estimates alone.
II. ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE ECONOMYWIDE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN
The electric utility industxy is a prime culprit in the economywide post-1973
productivity growth slowdown. As shown in Table 1, growth in labor productivity (output
per hour) in the electric utility industry proceeded at a rate triple that of the aggregate
economy from 1899 to 1948, and at a rate 2.5 times as fast from 1948 to 1973. After 1973,
however, the previously rapid rate of advance for electric utilities caine screeching to a halt,
as productivity growth slowed to the same low rate as experienced by the aggregate
economy.
Table 1 also displays the growth rate of the real price of electricity over the same
time intervals. Here the rate of improvement decelerated sharply immediately after World

















1982, averages for 1978
17 positive outliers 12 1963 1179 366 126 1.07
12 negative outliers 0 1946 622 96 178 .0.62
Outliers telephoned in
¡990, averages for 1987
15 positive outliers 4 1968 1473 470 224 0.74
15 negative outliers 8 1966 898 70 169 .0.88
Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 2 TABLE 13
Summary Information on Outlier PlantsTABLE 12
Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
Allowing for the Establishment and Finn Effects
Unedited Sample for Coal Using Plants, 1948-87
Equation with Equation with
Baiic Establishment Establishment and
Ecuation Effects and Firm Effects
'Within"'Between" "Within'"Detw. Estab." 'Betw. Firm'
Effect (p)Effect (#) Effect (fi)Effect (#)Effect (0)
Note:Asterisks Indicate 5 percent () or 1 percent (") significance levels. Ail equations also include five location dummy
variables and two construction4ype dummy variables, as wefl as a constant term.
a. Plants with fewer than two observations were excluded.
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The fact that the real price fell so much more before 1948 than after, while growth in labor
productivity remained fairly steady through 1973, suggests that other factors must have made
a major contribution to the failing real price before 1948, e.g., a decline in the relative price
of fuel and of quality-adjusted capital input. The declining real price of electricity was an
important source of productivity growth in the aggregate economy through the early 1970s,
for historically much technical progress has been labor saving and electricity using
(Jorgenson, 1984).
A closer look at the postwar period is provided in Table 2, which documents the
behavior since 1948 of output and productivity in the public utility sector as defined in the
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA), and in the electric utility portion of the
utility sector. Also shown is the relative price of electricity. The top half of the table
displays levels of variables, and the bottom half displays annual rates of growth over five
year intervals.
Real GNP growth in the utility sector was most rapid before 1953, reached a plateau
between 1953 and 1973, almost ceased between 1973 and 1983, and then revived after 1983.
The slowdown in labor productivity growth in the sector began earlier than that of output,
and productivity growth was actually negative on average between 1973 and 1983, followed
by a revival during 1983-88. Productivity growth for electric utilities in column (4) displays
roughly the same pattern as for the utility sector in column (3). The final column shows that
the period of rapid productivity growth coincided with that of a decline in the relative price
of electricity, and the poor productivity decade of 1973-83 coincided with the period of most
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Log Cspacity 0.594" 0.590'"-O3' 0.601" 0.071' 0.101"
2. Log Utilization 0.068" 0.093".0.068 0.077" -0.105'" 0.058
3. Log Heat Rate 0.003" .0.076" 0.559" -0.074 0.739" O3Z
4. Number of
Units 0.066" 0.034 0.041 0.042' .0.012 0.129"
5. Vintage
a) AIl -0.026" -0.026" .0.021"
b) 1968-87 0.046'" 0.047" 0.044
6. Time
a) All Years -0.019"' -0.016" .0.016"
b) 196847 0.046" 0.044"'-.- 0.043"
0.807 0.809 0.827
Standard Error 0356 0.354 0337
Observations 2990' 2990" 2990'Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 4
rapid increase in the relative price of electricity.
Scope of the Study
This paper limits its attention to the production of electricity in steam plants using
fossil fuels.Electricity makes up about 70 percent of the "electricity, gas, and sanitary
services" industry aggregate in the NIPA, fossil-fuel steam accounts for almost three-quarters
of electricity generation (the rest is mainly hydro and nuclear), and employees involved in
generation make up about one-third of all employees on the payrolls of electric utilities.
Despite the relatively small fraction of total utility employment covered, the industry
segment analyzed in this paper has experienced a slowdown in productivity growth very
similar to that of the utility industry aggregate, as shown in Table 3. Here growth rates are
computed over intervals between three-year averages of levels to smooth year-to-year
variation in our sample of plants. Productivity growth in our sample of generating plants
decelerates somewhat faster than the BLS index for the electric utility industry through
1978-80 but was almost identical to the BLS index in the last interval through 1985-87.
Limitations
While the electric generating industry is appealing as a subject for study, our
regressions cover an extremely small fraction of U. S. employment and bear on only a smnll
fraction of the total U. S. productivity growth puzzle. A second qualification is that the
electric utility industry has entered a relatively "mature" phase of the industry growth cycle,
and thus it may not be surprising that its productivity growth would decline over time.
TABLE 11
Sources of Productivity Growth,
All Coal-Using Plants, By Decade
Annual Percentage Rates of Change,









A. Actual 8.23 4.75 -1.88 -035
B. Predicted 10.43 4.78 -1.86 -0.43
C. Contribution of
1. Capacity 3.91 2.71 -2.95 -Ois
a. Effect on Output 10.94 8.94 5.11 632
b. Minus Capacity Effect on Employment -6.82 -5.57 -3.18 -4.06
Minus VCAP & VSCAP Effects on Employment.0.21 .0.66 0.89 4.10
d. Minus TSCAP Effect on Employment -5.77 -6.89
2. Utilization 335 -0.45 .1.90 1.43
a. Effect on Output 333 .0.45 -2.83 0.63
b. Minus Utilization Effect on Employment 0.02 -0.00 .0.02 0.00
e. Minus TSUT Effect on Employment 0.95 0.80
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.08 0.22 -0.16 037
a. Minus HR Effect on Employment 0.08 0.22 -0.02 -0.09
b. Minus VSHR Effect on Employment -0.08 0.29
e. Minus TSHR Effect on Employment .0.06 0.17
4. Units .033 .0.14 0.05 -0.21
5. Average Vintage 2.90 2.75 031 -2.09
a. Basic Effect 2.90 2.75 3.58 330
b. 1968.87 Shift .3.07 -539
6. Time 1.10 1.10 .0.10 -0.10
a. Basic Effect 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
b. 1968-87 Shift -1.20 -1.20
7. Dummy Variables and Other 43.38 .1.41 2.69 050Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
With Interaction Effects, Coal-Using Plants,
1948-87
TABLE 10 Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 5
Noies: Astcrislcs indicate 5 percent () or 1 percent (") significance levcls.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy variablcs, as
well as a constant tCrm.
However, as we shall see the problems of the industiy go far beyond those that can be
attributed to maturity alone. A third qualification is that our data set, while it has the great
advantage that the majority of generating plants can be identified by vintage and observed
over a long period of time, lacks particular explanatory variables that have become
important during the productivity slowdoi period, especially measures of technical
characteristics like pressure, temperature, and the presence of scrubbers and cooling stacks.
Other data sets, e.g., that of Joskow and Rose (1985), are complementary, having the
advantage of including many of the technology variables needed to study the effects of
environmental regulation, but lacking the advantage in our data set of the ability to observe
a given establishment over a long period of time.
iii. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Characteristics of the Technology
Although electric utilities are monopolists in the local markets they serve, the
aggregate number of these individual monopolies is substantial, in contrast to the very small
number of major producers of generating equipment. Thus utilities can accurately be
described as price takers in the market for new equipment, and they also are 'quality takers
in the sense that their choice set is constrained by whatever price-quality combinations are
offered by equipment manufactures on the market at any given time.Research and










(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Log Capacity 0.592" 0.700" 0.705" 0.623"
2. Log Utilization 0.082" 0.067 0.105" -0.007
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.004 -0.224 -0.174" -0.294"
4. Number of Units 0.067" 0.069" 0.069" 0.062"
5. Average Vintage
a. All -0.026" -0.080" -0.082" -0.056"
b. 1968-87 Shift 0.047" 0.183" 0.186" 0.193"
c.1'5a(VCAP) 0.009" 0.009" 0.004"
d. 1Sb (VSCAP) -0.020" -0.022" -0.022"
e. 2 ' 5a (VUT) -0.001
f. 2' 5b (VSUT) 0.013
g. 3Sa (VHR) -0.006
h. 3Sb (VSHR) 0.122' 0.119" 0.074"
6. Time
a. All -0.019" -0.014" -0.013 -0.011"
b. 1968-87 Shift 0.045" 0.038" 0.038" -0.012
c. 1 ' 6b (TSCAP) 0.009"
d. 2 * 6b (TSUTIL) 0.013"
e. 36b (TSHR) 0.039"
0.805 0.811 0.811 0.815
Standard Error 0357 0.351 0351 0348
Observations 3036 3036 3036 3036Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 6
utility industiy.2
The production process involves the transformation of the internal energyin a fuel
source into electrical energy. A power generation"unit" operates independently of any other
units at a given plant location and consists of a boiler to burn the fueland to generate and
expand the steam, and a turbo-generator which converts high-pressure steaminto electric
energy through the rotaiy motion of a turbineshaft. A condensor converts the steam into
water to complete the cycle. The entire unit is called a"boiler-turbo-generator", or BTG
unit. A central measure of the efficiency of this transformation processis the "heat rate"
(HR) of the cycle, the ratio of input in British thermal units (Btu) to onekilowatt-hour
HR.BTU input (1)
KWH output
Thus the higher the heat rate, the more fuel is being consumedin the production of a given
amount of electricity, and the less efficient isthe generation process. The heat rate moves
inversely to a companion ratio called "thermal efficiency."
2. This verdict is qualified by Hirsch (1989, p.71), who argues that 'to explain progressin electric power
technològy simply as a result of research and development performed by manufacturers wouldbe one-sided and
misleadin&" The other side of technical advance is achieved by utility management, 67 percentof which in 1964
consisted of trained engineers. Managers in particular companiesperceived themselves ascompeting for the role
of technological leadership and constantly pressed equipment manufacturers to achievetechnical advances, taking
the risk that unproved technology would be successfuL However, this role of managementis not counted as
research and development (R&D) by normal accounting methods, and Hirschhimself reports that utility-funded
R&D in 1970 amounted to only 0.23 percent of gross revenues.
TABLE 9
Average Heat and Utilization Rates
by Fuel Type, Selected Intervals,

















I. Heat Rate 123 103 10.0 9.8 10.0 10.4 10.6 10.6
a. Coal Using 123 10.4 9.9 9.5 9.9 10.5 10.5 10.6
b. Oil Only 11.6 103 10.1 9.2 9.3 10.0 10.9
c. Gas Only 12.7 11.6 10.5 103 10.2 10.5 10.7 --
2. Utilization
Rate 65.1 60.6 64.6 61.7 48.4 42.1 44.5 41.5
a. Coal Using 66.8 56.1 66.9 63.7 47.4 47.3 48.4 41.5
b. Oil Only 65.6 50.7 563 68.7 52.4 34.4 18.8
c. Gas Only 66.7 61.9 553 58.9 46.6 38.0 57.1Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant over Split Sample Periods,
1948-67 and 1968.87
TABLE 8 ProductIvity in Electricity Generation, Page 7
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (**) significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy
variables, as weU as a constant term.
Technology and the Sources of Economies of Scale
Until the late 1960s technical change in the design of BTG units was aimed primarily
at increasing the size of generators and boilers, and at improving the thermal efficiency of
the generating cycle by increasing the temperature to which the steam is heated, increasing
the pressure of the steam entering the turbine, and reducing the heat which is transferred
out of the cycle in the condenser. The technical design frontier was limited by the ability
of boilers to withstand high temperatures and pressures, and the frontier was pushed out by
incremental advances, particularly in metallurgy involving the development of high
temperature steel alloys. Most of the shift to higher temperatures and to reheat cycles was
completed during the 1948-57 decade, with little fbrther change thereafter, whereas the
increase in pressure rating continued until the late 1960s.
The average scale of BTG units also increased, with 58 percent of new units rated
below 50 megawatts in 1948, and 60 percent above 500 megawatts in 1987. The increase
in scale proceeded steadily through the mid-1970s and then ceased. Increased scale was
interdependent with improved thermal efficiency, since many of the efficiency improvements
required greater capital expenditures, the expense of which could be partially offset by
increased scale.3 Cowing (1970) has dubbed this interaction between increasing scale and
3. Engineers use a 'six-tenth? rule for approximating the additional cost of a capacity increase, je., a one
percent increase in capacity increases capital cost by 0.6 percent, reflecting the geometrical fact that a one
percent increase in the volume of a sphere increases its surface area by about 0.6 percent (Moore,1959).
Coal Using Noncoal Using
1948-67 1968.87 1948-67 1968.87
1. Log Capacity 0.541" 0.665' * 0.409" 0.522' *
2. Log Utili7tion .0.080* 0.150" 0.001 0.022
3. Heat Rate 0.674* * -0.058 0.861" 0.260
Residual
4. Units 0.083" 0.053" 0.089" 0.059"
5. Average Vintage
a. All Vintages.0()28" .O()29" -0016" -0.029"




-0.013" 0.027" -0.012" -0.012"
7. Fuel
a. Coal Using
b. Oil Only 0.025 0.057'
C. Gas Only -0.147" -0.116"
0.834 0.763 0.837 0.762
Standard Error 0.287 0.373 0.236 0.330
Observations 984 2049 511 1484Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 8
technical improvements 'scale augmenting technical change.'4
The end of the era of increasing size helps to explain the productivity slowdown, and
so it is important to determine whether the sources of the previous growth in scale had
primarily been technological advance or the increasing size of the market. The technologi-
cal hypothesis emphasizes the incremental advance of technology toward a technical ceiling
reached in the late 1960s, at the beginning of the slowdown period. In contrast the market
hypothesis stresses the role of higher energy prices in the 1970s in reducing the growth in
demand for electricity, and predicts that further advances in scale should resume in response
to the post-1983 decline in the real price of electricity.
One way to distinguish the two hypotheses is to ask why generator units were so small
in the early part of the postwar period. Either manufacturers did not have the technical
competence to produce larger units at reasonable cost, or markets were too small to support
the purchase of larger units. One indirect piece of evidence that supports the technological
explanation is that the average number of units installed per newly constructed plant during
the 1947-50 period was 2.0, and six plants in our data set were built with three or four units
during that interval. If larger pieces of equipment had been available at a lower cost per
unit of capacity, they would have been purchased in place of two or more of the smaller
units.
Numerous commentaries attribute the gradual increase in scale to a technological
4. As Wills illustrates (1978, p. 500), there is little further improvement in thermal efficiency as unit sizes
increase beyond 250 megawatts. Indeed, after increasing from 3 percent in 1880 to 22 percent in 1947, thermal
efficiency leveled off at about 33 percent in the late 1950s and showed no change after than (Hirsch, 1989, Figure
1, p. 4).
TABLE 7
Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant with Vintage Averaging, 1948-87
All Fuels Coal Using Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity 0.580" 0.592" 0.450"
2. Log Utilization 0.088' * 0.082" 0.024
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.074 0.004 0.402"
4. Number Units 0.061' 0.067" 0.066"
5. Average Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.030" -0.026" -0.026"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.049" 0.047" -0.014"
6. Time
a) All Years .0.014" .0.019" -0.011'
b) 1968-87 0.036" 0.045" 0.023"
7. Fuel
a) Coal Using .0.343"
b) Oil Only -0.065" -0.058"
c) Gas Only .0.051' * -0.112"
0.802 0.805 0.790
Standard Error 0.359 0.357 0313
Observations 5031 3036 1996
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (') significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two coostruction-tWe dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant 1948-87
TABLE 6 ProductIvity in Electricity Generation, Page 9
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (") significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.
frontier that advanced incrementally.For instance, an engineering study in the early
postwar period carried out on units in the range of 50-100 KW stated: "we have every
confidence that continued progress in metallurgy and design skill will make units larger than
those now in operation economically feasible" (Kirchmayer e. aL, 1955, p. 609). One of the
conference discussants of the same study stated that "size must not run ahead of our proved
progress in metallurgy. From recent evidence it seems that size has now outrun progress"
(p. 613).Hirsch emphasizes metallurgy, and attributes advances in size, pressure, and
temperature in the early postwar years to "advances in metallurgical knowledge gained
during the war and used in aircraft and artillery . . . newly developed 'super alloy' steels that
resisted metal fatigue and cracking, for example, allowed engineers to design larger
components for more power output" (1989, p. 89-90).Thus the engineering literature
appears to support the technological hypothesis over the market hypothesis as the primary
source of scale economies achieved prior to 1970.
Technology "Hits the Wall"
Until World War Il the traditional approach in achieving improvements in scale and
efficiency had been the "design-by-experience" approach in which each step to a new
technological plateau was followed by a period of debugging before the next advance
occurred. In the postwar period, spurred by the rapidly growing demand for electricity,
equipment manufacturers shifted to a more aggressive philosophy called "design-by-
extrapolation" in which the next advance was planned before operating experience had
All Fuels Coal Using Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity 0.539" 0.554" 0.453"
2. Log Utilization 0.120" 0.051" 0.032"
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.219" 0.186" 0.508"
4. Number Units 0.061" 0.060" 0.073"
5. Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.015' * -0.014" -0.011"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.032" 0.031" -0.012"
6. Time
a) All Years -0.027" -0.029" -0.024"
b) 1968-87 0.047" 0.053" 0.032"
7. Fuel Type
a) Coal Using -0.004"
b) Oil Only -0.188"
e) Gas Only -0.213" -0.115"
0.782 0.792 0.788
Standard Error 0.373 0.357 0.3 12
Observations 6674 4181 2491Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 10 TABLE 5
Equations Explaining The Log of Heat Rate
by Plant, 1948-87
occurred with the previous step.5 Much of the pressure for this new approach came from
the demand for new equipment by utility management who were struggling to keep up with
the demand created by a falling real price of electricity and by their own advertising
designed to stimulate the use of electricity.
The first technological barrier to be reached was an effective upper limit to thermal
efficiency, which had a natural theoretical limit of about 48 percent. Although a few best-
practice plants reached 40 percent, the steeply rising marginal cost of improving efficiency
through the use of exotic and expensive steels prevented further progress.Further,
experience revealed that the 100° increase in temperature from the typical unit of the 1950s
to the 1960s increased corrosive activity fiftyfold, led to the discovexy that "we suddenly are
susceptible to new diseases like stress corrosion cracldng."6 Increased corrosion, in turn,
required increased downtime for maintenance, and this in turn coùtributed to lower
utilization rates on new units.
The arrival of the effective plateau in thermal efficiency in the late 1950s increased
the emphasis on scaling-up of boilers and generators, but by the end of the 1960s this had
also begun to create unanticipated problems. The scale frontier was reached when utilities
discovered that downtime was as much as five times greater for units larger than 600 MW
7.8.
Where no citations are given, specific details in this section are obtained from Hirsch (1989), Chapters
Interview with a plant manager, quoted by Hirsch (1989, p. 93).
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent ("') significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two constructIon-type dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.
All Fuels CoalUsing Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity -0.084" -0.083" -0.078"
2. Log Utilization -0.127" -0.147" -0.104"
3. Relative Price -0.094" -0.163" .0.039"
4. Number Units 0.016" 0.011" 0.024"
5. Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.002" -0.003" -0.002"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.007* * 0.008" 0.002
6. Time
a) All Years -0.008" -0.013" -0.003"
b) 1968-87 0.017" 0.025" 0.007"
7. Fuel Type
a) Coal Using -0.001"
b) Oil Only 0.029" -0.006
c)Gas Only -0.027" -0.018"
0.649 0.516 0.586
Standard Error 0.124 0.130 0.099
















Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 11
than for units in the 100 MW range.7 Part of this was directly a function of size, since the
time required for units to cool down and heat up is directly related to the mass of the unit,
and part related to the greater complexity of the larger units.Further, metallurgical
problems cropped up in the huge turbine blades on large units, related to the laws of physics
that dictated huge centrifugal forces, as much as 33 tons of force on a 7-pound blade.
The last component of the new technological era involved not just hitting a
technological wail but rather amounted to a full-fledged retreat. Design-by-extrapolation
led to the development in the late 1950s and early 1960s of thesupercritical" boiler
(achieving a pressure above 3200 p.s.i.). However, after reaching a 63 percent share in new
installations during 1970-74, the share fell to 6 percent in 198 1-82 (Joskow-Rose, 1985, Table
1, p. 4). The backing off from supercritical technology resulted mainly from unanticipated
maintenance problems, documented in the interviews at the end of this paper.8
The arrival of a technological frontier interacted with the pitfalls of the design-by-
extrapolation approach, which downgraded the importance of waiting for experience to
accumulate with new larger units.9 Yet as time went on many problems developed that
could have been alleviated with a more cautious approach, e.g., stability problems with
Joskow-Rose (1985, p. 23) report that average equipment availability over the 1969-80 period ranged from
82.8 percent for units of 100 MW to only 62.6 percent for units of 900 MW.
The interviewa contained in an early draft of this paper are cited as an explanation of the abandonment
of supercritical units by HIrsch (1989, pp. 97-9) and Joskow-Rosc (1985, p.23). Note that the Joskow-Roac
evidence suggests that the availability penalty of supercritical units of given size is less than the penalty of
increasing the size of subcritical units from 500 to 900 MW.
9. HIrsch (pp. in-5) provides specific citations of overoptimistic predictions made in the 1950s and 19605
of continued steady advances in temperature, pressure, and size.
NewAll New All NewAll NewAll
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1948-50 11 70 8.20 6.03 85 139 64 62
195 1-53 10 105 11.01 8.13 121 168 67 64
1954-56 9 137 20.3910.63 259219 59 59
1957-59 8 157 22.53 12.18 221254 65 54
1960-62 5 174 29.68 14.63 325324 62 51
1963-65 8 188 29.5018.95 347381 61 53
1966-68 6 203 39.152334 651462 59 57
1969-71 6216 33.9026.00 578561 48 57
1972-74 8.240 30.8727.78 862681 44 53
1975-77 11260 30.4027.16 749769 42 47
1978-80 8270 18.8225.09 818834 42 47
1981-83 5228 20.3326.06 7941009 46 47
1984-85 4 197 18.4625.71 9461174 46 47
1986-87 2194 12.7725.56 9211195 35 47Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 12
turbines, twisted and cracked turbine blades, and ash buildup in furnaces. Because of large
costs in downtime, added maintenance, and retrofittingof units with flawed designs, the
initial cost of equipment appears significantly to understate the 'true' cost of equipment
delivered in the 1960s. In more recent years manufacturers have learned from their design
failures in 1960s-vintage equipment how to avoid design flaws and improve reliability, and
failure rates for 1980s vintage equipment have declined radically.1°
A timing argument exempts environmental regulation from any appreciable blame
in this technological history.Unanticipated problems developed in a major way with
equipment manufactured in the early 1960s, yet the response of utilities to environmental
regulation is usually dated from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (Goilop-Roberts,
1983, p. 654). Yet as the 1970s evolved, environmental regulation played a growing role in
the slowdown in labor productivity growth and decline in thermal efficiency experienced by
utilities, as regulations induced a shift away from soft coal, required major capital
expenditures for scrubbers and other devices, and substantially raised the requirement for
maintenance employees. Thus productivity growth was impeded after the early 1970s by
both the technological plateau and by environmental regulation, introducing a serious
identification problem for any study attempting to explain the productivity growth slowdown.
10. The 'forced-outage' rate after the first year of service for Westinghouse equipment droppedfrom 9
percent for equipment shipped in 1965.69 to 2 percent in 1975-80 to 0.5 percent in 1980-84.
TABLE 3
Output Per Employee,








1948- 1950 1957 - 1959 6.7 - 7.8
1957 - 1959 1966 - 1968 5.3 7.0 7.3
1966- 1968 1972. 1974 3.9 4.8 2.8
1972 - 1974 1978 - 1980 -0.4 1.6 -1.7
1978 - 1980 1985 - 1987 0.5 0.1 0.4
Sources by column:(1) Output, same sources as Table 2, coI. (1); employees from NIPA Table 61GB.
Same as Table 2, col. (4).
New data set developed for this paper, see Data Appendix.TABLE 2
Selected Figures on Industry Output,
Productivity and Prices,
Levels and Growth Rates, Selected Intervals, 1948-88
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Technological Histoiy and Its Impilcations for Econometric Research
Previous research on the production process for electricity generation (Cowing-Smith,
1978; Wills, 1978) reached a consensus that the usual economic approach to production,
based on the notion of homogeneous, divisible, and highly substitutable factor inputs, does
not apply for this industry.Instead, the dominant feature of the production process is
heterogeneous capital that incorporates the most efficient technology available at the date
of its construction but, once built, embodies fixed technical characteristics that impose very
tight constraints on the feasible set of input-output combinations. The firm's choices are
decomposed between flex ante" investment decisions and "ex post" operating decisions, the
latter involving the choice of variable inputs needed to produce desired output with exIsting
equipment.
This two-stage view of the production process leads Barzel (1964), Wifis (1978), and
others to a two-step econometric procedure. The available opportunities that constrain the
firm's investment decision are characterized in a hedonic price function that relates the price
of equipment to its attributes. Then the operating decision is described in a regression of
fuel, employment, or both, on the main attributes of each installed set of equipment. Wills
concludes, in common with other studies dating back to Komiya (1962), that 'substitution
opportunities at the plant level between equipment, fuel, and labor are poor."
In light of the availability of recent research on the first-step hedonic regression for

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ALevels
1948 16.3 1.03 15.8 0.98
1953 26.5 1.11 23.8 0.93
1958 36.5 1.16 31.4 34.7 0.85
1963 49.9 1.17 42.7 51.0 0.80
1968 68.1 1.26 54.1 70.1 0.72
1973 92.6 1.41 65.7 88.4 0.74
1978 97.8 1.48 66.1 96.8 0.87
1983 104.3 1.67 62.5 90.9 0.99
1988 134.3 1.75 76.7 105.6 0.94
B. An,uwj RatesofGrowth
1948-53 9.7 1.5 8.2 .1.0
1953-58 6.4 0.9 5.5 -1.8
1958-63 6.3 0.2 6.1 7.7 -1.2
1963-68 6.2 1.5 4.7 6.4 -2.1
1968-73 6.1 2.2 3.9 4.6 0.5
1973-78 1.1 1.0 0.1 1.8 3.2
1978-83 1.3 2.4 -1.1 .1.3 2.6
1983-88 5.1 0.9 4.1 3.0 .1.0
Sources by column:(1)-(3) and (5) from NIPA as follows, (1): 1948-73, Table 6.2, line 49, linked in 1977
to Survey of Current Business, January 1991, Table 6, line 49, p. 34; (2): Table 6.11,
line 1.5; (3)(1)/(2); (5) Table 7.10, line 50.
(4) uses the same sources as Table 1, col. (2).Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 14
explaining the usage of labor and fuel inputs for the installed stock of equipment.11 Such
a study seems justified in view of the passage of time since the lastround of studies by
Cowing (1970, 1974), Wills (1978), and Bushe (1981))2Another justification is that new
questions have been raised by the productivity slowdown and by environmental regulation.
Finally, most of the more recent studies have been based on firm rather than the
establishment data used here and have been more concerned with measuring economies of
scale than interpreting the productivity slowdow&
IV. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATA
The Employment Equation
This section of the paper specifies a regression equation in which plant employment
is explained by output and by various embodied characteristics of installed BTG units. This
corresponds to the "ex post" or "operating" decision that, according to the consensus of
previous research, is constrained by previous "ex ante" or "investment" decisions. Labor
Sec especially Joskow.Rose (1985) and Gordon (1990), which estimate equipment price indexes that
decrease rapidly relative to the corresponding NIPA indexes through the late 1960s and rise much faster
thereafter.
The earlier studies are surveyed by Cowing and Smith (1978).
Among these studies are Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), Gollop and Roberts (1981, 1983), Cowing.
Small and Stevenson (1981), and Christensen and Greene (1976). The advantages of plant over &m data are
discussed by Cowing and Smith (1978), pp. 175.7, with reference to the papers by Nerlove (1963) and
Christensen-Greene (1976). A dissenting opinion is offered by Gollop-Roberts (1981, p. 120), who argue that
"producers make input decisions on the basis of technical and market conditions facing the complete system, not
isolated plants.' However, when plant data are available, there is no reason to make this choie ex ante, as
aggregation issues can be studied explicitly by estimating firm and establishment effects, as in Table 12 below.
Sources by column:
TABLE i
Output Per Hour Nonfarm Business and Electric Utilities,
and Real Price of Electricity, Various Intervals,
1899. 1988
1899-1948, Kendrick (1961), Table A.XX, pp. 338-40, linked in 1948 to
Economic Report of the President, 1990, Table C-46.
1899.1953, ICendsick (1961), Table H-VI, pp. 590.91, linked in 1953 to
NIPA Table 6.2, line 49 (electric, gas, and sanitary services), linked in 1958
to BLS for electric utilities (1958-63 from BLS Bulletin 2296, February 1988,
Table 261, p. 142 and 1963-88 from BLS Bulletin 2349, February 1990, Table
279, p. 150).
1899-1970, Hirsch (1989), Figure 7, p. 9, linked to NIPA, Table 7.10, line









1899 - 1923 2.1 5.7 -7.4
1923. 1948 2.1 6.1 -6.7
1948- 1963 2.6 6.8 .1.3
1963. 1973 2.2 5.5 -0.8







Percentage Deviation of Vintage and Time Trend
Coefficients from 1968 Level,
Employment Regression, Coal and Noncoal Plants
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requirements and fuel use are taken to be endogenous choice variables, and equipment
characteristics and output are the exogenous explanatory variables. Plant capacity, fuel type,
and location are assumed to be predetermined by previous investment decisions, and output
(or utilization), is assumed to be set by an exogenously determined demand for electricity
at preset prices.
Because causation goes from output to inputs, and because there are two input
equations, it is inappropriate to take the estimated coefficients from a single input equation,
e.g., labor, and attempt to invert them to retrieve the underlying production function. We
begin with the employment equation, relate it to previous research, and then subsequently
adopt a parallel specification for the fuel input equation. The basic employment regression
is estimated below for plant data in the following form:
mLa0 + 1InC + azin(.) + a3 In e
(2)
+ a4N + a5 V + a6 r + E f3,D1 +
¡.1
where L is employment, C is capacity, Q is output, a1is the "heat rate residual" discussed
below, N is the number of units, Vis vintage, T is the year of each observation, the D are
ten dummy variables for type of fuel, type of construction, and location, andCLis the error
term. It is useful to compare (2) with other specifications of the employment equation, e.g.,
those of Wills (1978, p. 508):Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 16
L!+( =
L.
and of Busbe (1981, p. 194):
InL=
The additional symbol in the Wills equation iswhich stands for a set of eight overlapping
dummy variables for year of observation, in contrast to the linear time trend (7') imposed
in (2).14 The Bushe equation omits vintage effects and instead uses design data to divide
up the total sample into seven technically homogeneous cells, and the coefficients in
equation (4) are separately for each cell. The log-linear functional form of our specification
(2) is shared with (4). In contrast, in (3) Wills begins with a linear form but allows for
interaction effects and normalizes by capacity. Bushe also implicitly normalizes by capacity,
since the average capacity within his seven separate cells differs by several orders of
magnitude.
A basic difference between the three specifications is the allowance for both time and
vintage effects in (2), only vintage effects in (3) and only "cell' effects in (4). The vintage
variable is included in (2) but not in (3), because the latter includes observations only for
newly installed plants, whereas the former includes observations for each year of operation.
The Bushe approach in (4) appears to be inconsistent, in that data for multiple years of
Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 65
operation, that is, the year after the vintage year, and were also excluded for years t-1 and
t whenever there was a change in year t in either the number of units or anon-negligible
change in capacity. This exclusion principle applies both to increases and decreases in units
and/or capacity.
4.Average Vintage. Most of the regression results refer to the "average"
vintage of a plant. This is simply the average of the vintage for each unit in the plant. A
plant installed in 1955 with 5 units that adds an additional unit in 1966 would be coded as
vintage 1956.8, rounded to 1957.
14. The two dummy variables in the Wills equation are for presence of coal burning and of more than one
unit, and in the Bushe equation the single dummy variable represents the presence of coal burning.large (measured by either capacity or output) as the average for the 1981 population.
Editing and Adjustments
The total sample of 7701 was edited down to the 6674 observations used in the initial
regression reported in the first column of Table 5. Several criteria were used in editing and
apply to the entire data set, not just the new post-1971 observations added for this project.
Cleaning. Observations were excluded when (a) the utilization rate was
below 5 percent, (b) when data seemed to be of the wrong order of magnitude, (c) when
plant statistics were reported jointly with a nuclear or gas turbine plant, or (d) when data
were missing for specific variables needed for a regression. Particular care was taken to
make sure that the location, plant construction, and vintage dummies were identical from
year to year for each plant, and that there were no implausible jumps in data on capacity
and the number of units. In years when plant capacity was missing, this could sometimes
be calculated from data on output and the utilization rate.
Adjustments. There were six cases when two or three plants shared a
single listed employment figure, and in these cases all variables were aggregated over the
plants in question to form a single observation for the hybrid plant. In some recent years
data are reported as applying to a percentage 'P' of the plant, and quantity data are then
divided by T'. Comparisons with adjacent years are made to determine whether "P" applies
to all variables, especially employment data. Where some units were indoors and some
outdoor, the construction plant dummy was coded 'semi-outdoor.'
Configuration Changes. Plants were included only in the first full year of
operation are included for each plant but no vintage variable is introduced.'5
The larger number of dummy variables included in (2) reflects the much larger
sample size in our study. Our sample consists of 6674 observations after editing, in contrast
to 163 for Wills and cell sample sizes ranging from 25 to 162 for Bushe. Our larger sample
size stems both from the inclusion of each plant for every year of operation (starting from
the first complete year), and also the addition of 18 extra years of data beyond that available
to Bushe and Wills.
Because our point of departure is the productivity slowdown, the estimates below of
(2) allow the vintage (a5) and time (a6) coefficients to shift after 1968. We attempt to
identify the sources of these shifts by allowing for interaction effects and by isolating
observations that are consistent 'outliers.' Another difference among the specifications is
apparent in Wills' omission of an output or utilization variable, in contrast to its inclusion
in equations (2) and (4).
The Fuel Input Equation and the 'Heat Rate Residual"
The conventional economic theory of production based on homogeneous and highly
substitutable inputs might lead to the expectation of a negative coefficient on the heat rate
(energy use divided by output) stemming from substitution between energy and labor. In
contrast our basic approach holds that there are few ex post substitution opportunities
15. Busbe edits bis sample to include observations beginning in the second full year of operation and
extending until the end of the sample or two years prior to installation of a new unit. We begin in the first full
year of operation and apply a different editing criterion described in the Appendix.
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regressions as a proxy for unmeasured design characteristics of plants of a givencapacity and
vintage. Our treatment of the heat rate variable as an indicator of plantefficiency is
consistent with the approach of Schxnalensee and Joskow (1985, p. 1), whoexplicitly list heat
rate as one of two "indices of quality,' the other being the plant'savailability factor.
To embody the idea that the heat rate effect represents unmeasureddesign
characteristics, in the present paper the employment equations include not the heat rate
itself but rather the residual from the fuel input equation, CHwhich is specified:
InHR =+ a1lnC +u2ln(-) + 3lfl(_!)
lo
+ a4N + a5 V + a6T+ E13D, +
t-1
The specification of the fuel input equation is identical to that of the labor input equation
(2), except that the heat rate term in (2) is replaced by the relative price of fuel (PI/PL).
After (5) is estimated, the residual for each observation is included as an explanatory
variable in (2).
Data and Estimation Issues
The data file includes all plants listed in the publication Steam-Electric Power
Construction Cost and Annua! Production Expenses for the period 1948-87. Intotal 401
individual plants are represented, of which 68 were constructed prior to 1948, 113during




All data were obtiined from the annual publication of the U. S. Energy Information
Mmnistration. In 1978 the title of the publication changed from 'Steam-Electric Plant
Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses' to "Thermal-Electric Plant and
Construction Cost and Annual Expenses," and then in 1982 to "Historical Plant Cost and
Annual Production Expenses for Selected Electric Plants." In prior years the publication
was issued by predecessor agencies, particularly the Federal Power Commission.
The data file contains plants observed from 1948 to 1987, but vintages of these plants
extend back to the early years of the century. Data for years through 1971 were obtained
from Thomas Cowing, and data for years since 1972 were added by successive research
assistants. Most plants added to the original data set had vintage of 1972 or newer, with six
exceptions. Some changes in plant identification also occurred as a result of merging of
units previously considered as separate plants.The complete data set contains 7701
observations, with 29 basic variables per observation (including dummies for fuel type,
construction type, and regional location), and a number of additional constructed variables.
The 1982 change in the title of the data source also involved a downsizing of the data
from a nearly complete census to a sample. Plants excluded in 1982 and subsequent years
amounted to 25 percent of the plants in the 1981 population, but only 9 percent of the total
output of the 1981 population, since the excluded plants were on average only one-third as
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observed in each successive year starting with the first year after its commencement of
operations, the sample is quite large, consisting of 7701 observations prior to editing.
Editing pruned the sample down to 6656 observations, as described in the Appendix.
Several features of the data need to be considered when interpreting the econometric
results below. The greatest problems are posed by the presence of technically heteroge-
neous units in some multi-unit plants, and by varying technical specifications in new plants
of a given vintage. Spurious errors caused by the first of these can be minimized either by
editing the sample or by including dummy variables. The second cannot be escaped but
should cause no bias in coefficients if the distribution of technical features across plants of
a given vintage tends to remain constant over successive vintages. A final data problem
involves possible measurement errors in the data on plant employees.16
Table 4 exhibits for selected intervals, separately for new plants and all plants, the
annual average number of plants, and their average capacity (C), utilization rate (Q/C), and
output per employee (Q/L). The new plants have a smaller capacity than the average for
all plants in several of the early intervals. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by
a greater number of small-sized units in existing plants (average units per plant decreased
steadily from 11.0 in pre-1948 plants to 1.5 in plants of the 1986 vintage).'7 Productivity
in new plants actually declined by two-thirds between 1966-68 and 1986-87, while productivity
Bushe complains that the labor data are imprecise....misleading'S and cites instances of firms that
allocate all maintenance labor to one plant. We return to this issue in discussing our interviews with managers
of outlier plants.
There were no new plants built in 19V, a fact confirmed by Hirsch (1989), p. 165.on all plants increased by 9 percent. The two final columns exhibit thestriking finding that
the utilization rate for new plants was higher than for all plants prior to 1968, while the
reverse was true beginning in 1969-71.
V. ESTIMATED FUEL AND LABOR INPUT EQUATIONS
The Fuel Input Equations
The estimated coefficients for the fuel input equation (5) are presented in Table 5,
where the three columns report results for all plants in the edited sample, and for the subset
of coal-using and noncoal-using plants.18 The significance of coefficients is indicated by
asterisks, and evezy coefficient in the table is significant at the one percent level, with three
exceptions.
The negative coefficient on capacity implies that the well-documented economies of
scale in equipment cost and labor use extend to fuel use as well. The negative coefficient
on utilization could indicate both that plants which experience a lot ofdowntime are also
inefficient users of fuel, and that fuel is wasted when plants are shut down for maintenance
and then started up again. The relative price term has the expected negative sign and is
much larger for coal than noncoal plants. As would be expected, plants which generate a
18. The vintage and time trend shifts are dethed in exactly the same way. The vintage trend is ntered
on 1968, that is, equals -20 in 1948,0 in 1968, and +19 in 1987. The vintage trendshift variable equals zero in
allycars through 1968, and thenequalsthetrend runningfroin +1m 196910 +19 in1987. The'base" for the
fuel-use dummy variable refers to plants which use both oil and gas.
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given output with several small units use more fuel than plants with fewer and larger
units.19
Both the vintage trend and time trend coefficients have a V-shaped pattern, with a
negative overall trend more than offset by a positive post-1968 trend. The trends imply for
all plants in column (1), for instance, that a 1948-vintage plant of given size used 2 percent
more fuel per unit of output than a 1968 plant, and that a 1987-vintage plant used 93
percent more fuel. All of the deterioration after 1968 can be attributed to coal plants, since
the two vintage terms for noncoal-using plants are of equal and opposite sign, implying flat
fuel use after 1968. The time trend coefficients imply the same V-shaped pattern for plants
of a given vintage observed in successive years and are consistent, for instance, with the
effect of environmental regulations in causing a shift from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal and
oil requiring more BTrJs to generate a unit of output.2° The results indicate that the
experience of coal and noncoal plants differs; the F(19,6819) ratio of 29.1 far exceeds the
one percent critical value of 1.87, indicating that the data for the two fuel types cannot be
pooled as in column (1).
An interesting interaction among the coefficients becomes evident when the
equations in Table 5 are reestiniated with the relative price variable omitted. This causes
Building fewer and larger units per plant economizes on capital cost and labor as well as fuel. See
HIrsch (1989, p.43), who also notes that prior to the 1930s as many as eight boilers were neceasasy per turbine-
generator, but that by the 1930s firms had learned how to economize with "unit-type" construction, that is, one
boiler per generator.
Gollop and Roberts (1985) provide data on the cost of pollution control equipment and required
reductions in emissions, but not on the fuel-using effect of shifting to low-sulfur fueL
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the time trend and trend shift coefficients to drop by roughly half. Thus,with the relative
price omitted, about half of the pre-1968 improvement in fuel use for plants of a given
vintage, and about half of the post-1968 deterioration, is offset by the effect of a failing
relative price in sthnulating fuel use before the late 1960s and in encouraging fuel
conservation after the early 1970s.
The Basic Employment Equation
The first column of Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the basic
employment specification (equation 2 above) for the edited sample of 6674 observations.2'
The elasticity óf employment to capacity changes is 034, confirming the substantial
economies to scale found in previous studies.n The elasticity of employment to utilization
is 0.12, indicating that labor requirements fluctuate only modestly in response to demand
changes, and thus that labor productivity is highly sensitive to changes in utili,ntion. Taken
by itself this coefficient suggests that labor productivity should have declined in the 1970s
in response to decreasing average utilization (shown in Table 4).
The coefficient on the heat rate residual is positive, suggesting that plants having
relatively high energy requirements also have relatively high labor requirements.This
coefficient can be interpreted as a proxy for unmeasured design differences among plants
There are fewer observations here than in Table 5, because there are some observations which are
mksndata on empioyment but not the heat rate.
Joskow and Schmalensec (1983, pp. 48-54) provide a relatively recent survey.
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than average labor productivity, and that TFP growth in the pre.1968 period was so much
slower than the growth of average labor productivity, underlines the responsibility of capital
input growth for much of the industry's outstanding achievements ¡n the first half of the
postwar period and for its abysmal performance since then.
This paper represents only a beginning in studying the industry's productivity
problems. Much of the large "time shift" effect remains unexplained. A more complete
investigation would incorporate into the data more information on the design characteristics
of individual plants, although our interview study suggests that many explanatory factors will
inevitably be overlooked. A wider interview survey might reveal a more specific estimate
of the impact of air and water pollution control legislation.Comparisons with foreign
countries, using a combination of econometrics and interviews, might reveal the relative
roles of design philosophy, equipment reliability, operating procedures, and environmental
regulation in explaining why the European and Japanese electric power industries have not
exhibited deteriorating performance to the same extent as the American industry.
Finally, one might hope that the mixture of econometric and interview techniques utilized
here could be fruitfully employed in other industries, and that economists interested in
production economics might devote more attention to the possibility of interviewing the
business executives whose behavior they are trying to explain.
38. The more cautious design philosophy of European manufacturers during the postwar years is discussed
by Hirsch (1989), pp. 3, 75.
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of a given vintage and capacity.A plant having a relatively large number of small units
requires, understandably, more labor than another plant having the same capacity but a
relatively small number of larger units.
In lines 5 and 6 we find that the labor productivity slowdown has occurred across
both vintage and date of observation. The vintage trend coefficient is -0.015 for all years,
whereas the vintage shift variable has a coefficient of + 0.032 indicating a net deterioration
of productivity growth during 1968-87 at a rate of 1.7 percentage points per year on
successive newer vintages. The productivity of older plants deteriorated as well after 1968.
The coefficient for the trend on date of observation is -0.027, and that of the 1968-87 shift
variable is 0.047, indicating that after 1968 the productivity of existing plants of all vintages
deteriorated at a rate of 2.0 percentage points per year.Overall, successive vintages
improved in productivity by 30 percent between 1948 and 1967, after which productivity
declined by 32 percent between 1967 and 1987. Plants of all vintages observed in 1967 had
a productivity performance 54 percent better than plants observed in 1948, but afterward
there was a decline in productivity amounting to 38 percent by 1987. These estimates hold
constant the influence of capacity and utilization; hence in the early years these trends
understate the true effect of increasing vintage in contributing to productivity growth, since
increased capacity over successive vintages raised productivity until 1968, while after 1968
size levelled off but utilization fell, thus causing the time trend coefficients to understate the
. The estimation of the heat rate residual implies that it is independent of the other explanatory variables
in the equation, and hence it La not surprising that there is virtually no change in the other coefficients in the
employment equation if the heat rate residual is omitted.Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 24
true deterioration of productivity.
The fiiuil set of coefficients refers to dummy variables for fuel use. Coal use (either
by itself or together with other fuels) raises employment requirements by 19 percent
compared to oil-only and 21 percent compared to gas-only plants?'
The other col,imnc in Table 6 exhibit the results for the subsample of coal-using and
noncoal-using plants. The major differences are that the utilization effect is smaller for both
fuel groups when the sample is disaggregated; the heat rate effect is much higher for
noncoal plants, while the post-1968 deterioration in productivity measured by the vintage
trend shift applies only to coal plants, since noncoal plants show an acceleration in
productivity improvement over successive vintages. The V-shaped time trend coefficients
apply to both fuel groups, but the slope of the "V" is steeper for coal plants. The F(18,6636)
ratio of 71.9, compared to a one percent critical value of 1.87, provides strong evidence that
the observations for the coal and non-coal plants are not generated from the same
relationship.
Variations on the Basic Employment Equations
1. Year Triplets. The first variant is to replace the simple trend and trend shift
terms with separate vintage and time coefficients for successive intervals of three years each
('rear triplets"), 1949-51, 1952-54, etc. The results are plotted in Figure 1, where the top
24. This compares closely with the average of 22 percent for the coal use dummy across the seven cells in
Busbe's study (1981, p. 192).The linear specification of Wills' employment equation precludes direct
comparisons with his coefficients.
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by holding constant numerous characteristi of individual plants. If the on(y cause of the
slowdown in labor productivity growth in the electric utility industry had been a deceleration
in the rate of technical change embodied in new equipment, this would be imply that there
had been no slowdown in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), since all of the
declining growth rate of output per hour would be explained by an equal-sized decline in
the growth rate of capital's contribution to output. Another implication of this hypothetical
finding would be that the source of the productivity problem originates not in the electric
utility industry but in the electric equipment industry within the manufacturing sector.
However, a substantial fraction of the overall slowdown in labor productivity in
electricity generation can be linked to factors other than embodied technical change, and
thus did occur within the utility industry itself. In contrast to labor productivity growth for
our sample of plants, which exhibited a deceleration from 7.5 percent per annum in 1948-68
to -0.4 percent per year in 1968-87 (for a total slowdown of 7.9 points), TFP growth using
official NIPA deflators for the capital stock slowed from 3.6 to -1.8 percent per year (for a
total slowdown of 5.4 points). When the deflator of electric generating equipment is
measured by a hedonic index of the type developed by Gordon (1990) and Joskow-Rose
(1985), TFP slows from 1.8 to -2.7 points, for a slowdown of 4.5 points?7 Not coincidental-
ly, the slowdown of 4.5 points is very close to the time shift coefficients in our all-fuel
equations in Tables 6 and 7, ranging from 3.6 to 4.7 points. The fact that TFP slows less
37. This calculation is not shown in the paper to save space. Output, employment, and nominal equipment
cost refer to our sample of plants. The hedonic equipment deflator comes from Gordon (1990), Table 5.9, coL
(2), recalculated to 1986 from our redsed data.utilities had been on a binge of purchasing equipment. Our employment regressions imply
that 92 to 98 percent of any change in utilization flows through to a change in labor
productivity in the same direction.
The growth of average plant size and unit size decelerated sharply after the late
1960s. Before 1968 rapid increases in the scale of new plants, together with a relatively
smdl elasticity of employment growth to scale growth, allowed for productivity improve.
ments. Earlier increases in scale resulted from incremental improvements in technology,
particularly in metallurgy.After 1968, however, capacity growth appears to have
encountered technical constraints. The impact of this source of the productivity slowdown
is consistent with the "depletion hypothesis" of the overall economy-wide slowdown.
There was a disappearance in productivity gains associated with newer plants of
a given capacity, i.e., the "vintage shift' effect.Plant designers appear to have run into
unanticipated technical barriers that caused them to build plants that were too large, too
complex, and which required a high and unanticipated level of maintenance expenditures.
Beyond the contribution of equipment manufacturing problems to the productivity
slowdown, after 1968 the utility industxy encountered problems in operating pre-existing
equipment.Less than one-third of this 'time specific' effect can be attributed to
environmental legislation.An undetermined part of the rest is due to a previously
unanticipated maintenance backlog on plants of earlier generations built when technology
arrived at the apparent frontier in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The regressions in this paper attempt to explain the relation of employment to output
frame displays the percentage deviation of each vintage coefficient from the 1967.69
coefficient, and the bottom frame shows the same percentage deviation for the time
coefficients. The time coefficients in the bottom frame display the same 'V-shaped" pattern
as the more parsimonious specification in Table 6, and repeat our previous finding that the
"V" has a steeper slope for coal than for noncoal plants. Also, we can see here that the
pattern for the noncoal plants is better described as a "U" than a 'V", with a long flat
portion between 1965 and 1980.
However, the vintage coefficients in the top frame of Figure 1 do not trace out a
simple 'V-shaped' pattern and indicate that the parsimonious specification of Table 6 is
oversimplified. The F(24,4140) ratio of 3.29 for coal plants and F(22,2450) ratio of 8.64 for
noncoal plants indicates that the employment equation with separate coefficients for the
year-triplets fits significantly better than the specification in Table 6 that imposes two linear
trends centered on 1968. However, since the other coefficients in the equations appear to
be almost identical whether the Table 6 or year-triplet specification is used, we will explore
the other variants in this section with the Table 6 specification.
2. Average Vintage. The next variant is to move to a more accurate measure of
plant vintage. The results in Table 6 are based on the vintage listed in the original data
source, which is the date when the plant was first constructed. However, this does not take
account of the fact that many plants install additional units at a later date. A more accurate
vintage measure takes the average vintage of all units in the plant installed as of a given
year of observation. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires throwing away all
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of new units before 1948. There are several interesting changes in the coefficients in Table
7 as compared with Table 6.The utilization coefficient for noncoal plants becomes
insignificant, as does the heat rate residual coefficient for coal plants. The "V" of the
vintage trends becomes steeper for both fuel types, while the "V" of the time trends becomes
flatter for both fuel types.
3. Sample Spüt. All employment equations thus far force the coefficients other than
the vintage and time trends to be identical over the entire 1948-87 sample period. Table
8 examines the validity of this constraint by estimating separate equations for 1948-67 and
1968-87, while retaining the measure of average vintage introduced in the preceding section.
There are numerous changes in coefficients, indicating a change in structure over the two
halves of the postwar period. The capacity coefficients rise in the second half for both fuel
types. The utilization coefficient for coal now has the wrong sign in the first half and is
insignificant for noncoal in both halves. The heat rate residual coefficient is significant only
in the first half for both fuel types, indicating perhaps more heterogeneity in design in the
pre-1968 period.However, there is no important change in the vintage or time trend
coefficients. Bothimplythe usual "V-shaped" pattern for both the vintage and time effects.
The F(14,3004) ratio of 135 for coal and the F(14,1960) ratio of 5.1 for noncoal indicate
that the equations for the two halves of the postwar period cannot be pooled.
4. interaction Effects. The shift in structure over time suggested in Table 8 can be
paraineterized in a single equation by allowing for interaction effects among fuel type, heat
"residual" in aggregate studies.
In microeconomic research on data sets that identify individual observations, e.g.,
plants or firms, a study of a mysterious phenomenon like the productivity slowdown can
benefit from direct personal or telephone contact with plant or firm representatives.Such
contact can reveal errors in data or interpretation at previous stages of aparticular research
study, and can add detail to flesh Out an abstract academic conjecture, e.g., the"depletion
hypothesis."
Data sets that identify establishments and firms separately allow for a detailed
analysis of "within" establishment and "between" establishment and firm effects. This is an
unambiguous advantage of establishment data over the firm data used in many studies, and
isonlypartly offset by measurement errors when separate plants within a firm share
employees.
Substantwe Results
The steam-electric utility industry experienced a much sharper slowdown in the
growth of labor productivity after 1968 than the U. S. economy as a whole. Thestudy
identifies four main sources of the growth slowdown, each of which appears tohave
operated with more severity than in the whole economy.
1. A sharp drop in plant utilization occurred after the late 1960s,resulting both from
the two oil shocks that raised the relative price of electricity, andfrom the slowdown in
output and productivity growth in the rest of the economy. Bothof these factors caused the
growth rate of electricity demand to slacken sharply in the mid-1970simmediately after
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1960s. The technical barrier represented by supercritical pressure may be likened to the
barrier of supersonic speed in the aircraft industry. Coincidentally, the postwar upsurge in
aircraft scale and speed also seems to have come to an end around 1970 (Gordon, 1990,
Chapter 4). One ray of hope is that, having deteriorated so much from the optimism of
1965 to the gloom of 1982 the conditions for productivity growth do not seem to have
deteriorated further during the rest of the 1980s. Plant managers viewed themselves as
operating in a difficult environment, but with few exceptions felt that the environment had
remained stable over the past five years.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to decompose the sources of the slowdown in labor productivity
growth in the steam-electric generating industry among a number of possible causes.
Particular emphasis is placed on the separate roles of economies of scale, embodied
technical change, and disembodied technical change. The major conclusions can be divided
among methodology and substance.
Methodology
1. Data sets that provide information on individual plants observed along the two
dimensions of vintage and age are particularly useful in studying the sources of growth.
Cross-section data also allow for quantification of scale effects, shifts in the locational mix,
and other sources of productivity change that are lumped together as an unexplained
rate, utilization rate, and vintage, that may partially explain some of the behavior of
individual coefficients in Tables 6 and 7.In Table 9 heat rates and utilization rates are
displayed for new plants built at selected vintage intervals and for three fuel types. For
coal-using and oil-only plants, the relationship between vintage and heat rate traces out a
backward "J." This reversal still leaves the heat rate in 1983-86 lower (better) than in 1948-
52 in contrast to the implication of the vintage trend for coal plants in Table 5 (which
shows that the reversal more than cancelled the 1948-68 improvement). We can reconcile
this conflict when we recognize the role of the capacity effect in the regressions, which
explains part of the 1948-68 improvement in heat rate by increased scale rather than by the
vintage trend.
Exploration of every possible interaction effect for each of the three equations in
Table 6 is infeasible. Instead, the basic equation for coal-using plants with average vintages
(column 2 in Table 7) is presented in Table 10 with the addition of various interaction
effects. The previous discussion suggests that there may be important interaction effects
between vintage and vintage-shift, on the one hand, and capacity, utilization, and heat rate,
on the other hand. All six of these possible interaction effects are included in column (2)
of Table 10, and three are statistically significantthe log of capacity times the vintage
variable and vintage shift variables, and the heat rate residual times the vintage shift
variable. Column (3) estimates the same equation withonlythe five significant interaction
variables included from column (2). The first two interaction terms (lines Sc and Sd)
indicate that the 'V-shaped" pattern of the vintage shift is steeper for small than for large
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1948 to 0.71 in 1968, and then falling to 0.49 in 1987. The effect of increasing scale on
productivity is measured by unity minus this coefficient, and thus is V-shaped.The
implication that the productivity benefits of increased scale were lowest in 1968 seems
consistent with the maintenance problems of large plants built in the late 1960s, as discussed
in section VII below. The third interaction effect indicates a more severe adverse vintage
shift for plants that are energy inefficient.
We may also inquire which characteristics are correlated with an adverse 'time shift,"
i.e., tendency to require more employees with increasing plant age after 1968 as compared
to before 1968. The time shift interactions in column (4) indicate that this age deterioration
effect was greatest for plants that were relatively large, heavily utilized, and energy-
inefficent. The utilization interaction can be described in a second way: the employee
requirements imposed by an above-average utilization rate increased after 1968, possibly
because environmental regulations raised the employee requirements of maintenance for
high-utilization plants. Stated a third and perhaps more appealing way, the employee savings
made possible by a low utilization rate were greater after 1968, perhaps because plant
managers interpreted the low utilization rates as permanent rather than temporary as in the
1950s and reduced their work forces accordingly. It is important to note that the interaction
terms in column (4) cause the time shift variable to lose statistical significance.
25. The implied vintage and vintage shift coedents for 200 MW plants are -0.032 and+0.069,and for 2000
MW plants arc -0.012 and+0.019.
the worst may be over. Several managers cited enthusiastically the role of computerized
controls, which can analyze and predict maintenance problems before they occur. Don
Wilson at Mohave raved above his training simulator, which could train operators how to
handle every eventuality without endangering either of his two large 790 MW units. Tony
Leavitte of Gardner cited improved control systems and water treatment equipment as
allowing him to reduce his staff by about three percent over the most rent two years. He
was also enthusiastic about his CRT-equipped control room which allowed operators to plot
the "trend" of numerous variables like temperature and pressure and spot potential problems
in advance.
How do plant managers of negative outlier plants explain their low level of
employment? Consistent with my earlier research on airlines (1965), managers with poor
productivity performance blame outside forces, while managers with a high level of
productivity attribute their performance to themselves and their workers. James Stape of
the-San Tan (AZ) plant (neg. 90) stated flatly that 'we're good' and that his employees were
a 'close-knit" group, the 'opposite of Navajo," a plant owned by the same firm that is at the
top of our positive outlier list. Rick Smith of the Fort Phantom (TX) plant (neg. 90) cited
'the quality of our guys.' Tim Lavette attributed the performance of his Danskhanimer
plant to a "company philosophy to be lean up and down.'
Overall, the interviews add up to a convincing case in support of the 'depletion
hypothesis." Advances in productivity in the first two decades of the postwar era (and
before 1948 as well) were made possible by technical improvements that allowed for higher
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go.' Cathcart of Homer City claimed that manufacturers had sold larger units in the 1960s
by 'extrapolating the features of smaller units and convincing users that they didn't require
extra maintenance.'
In another comment with important implications for practitioners of the hedonic
regression technique, Cathcart contrasted the features of his two 600 MW supercritical units
(vintage 1969) with his 650 MW subcritical unit (vintage 1977). In putting out bids for the
earlier units, his company had emphasized low cost and had specified only a few basic
specificationstemperature, pressure, etc. In contrast, the bidding procedure for the newer
unit involved much more detailed specifications, chosen to avoid the maintenance problems
encountered in the earlier units. 'Wall thickness on tubes was increased from 150 to 200
mils, the maximum velocity of the gas stream was reduced from 85 to 55,' and so on. A
hedonic regression explaining equipment prices of the type developed in Gordon (1990,
Chapter 5) and Joskow-Rose (1985) would treat all three units as essentially identical and
would overstate the price increase from 1969 to 1977. Continuing the theme of 'learning
by doing,' James Agnew at Cuniberland attributed his ability to reduce plant staffing to a
gradual process of modifying his 1973-vintage 'prototype units' (two enormous units of 1300
MW each). The furnace had been changed, generating surface had been added to boilers,
and precipitator surface had been added.
The later group of interviews did not have quite as gloomy a tone as those conducted
earlier. In fact, there are some signs in the interviews (although not yet in our data) that
Implications of the Coefficients for the ProductWity Growth Slowdown
The sources of the productivity slowdown in the industry can be decomposed for
alternative equations and for alternative sets of years. Lines A and B compare the growth
rates of actual and predicted output per employee over the sample of coal-using plants. The
predicted value is based on actual output and the equation's prediction of employment
based on the estimated coefficients of column (4) in Table 10, multiplied by the mean values
of each independent variable for the year in question.
The seven lines of section C of the table decompose predicted productivity growth
in each decade among the contributions of the independent variables in the equation. Each
contribution is calculated by multiplying the appropriate coefficient times the change in the
independent variable over the previous decade. This is done in straightforward fashion for
the variables listed in lines O through C7, where output is treated as exogenous and every
predicted change in employment creates a change in productivity of the opposite sign. The
calculation of the effects of changing capacity and utilization require an extra step, since
both output and employment are altered. Line la shows the direct effect of higher capacity
on output, and line lb subtracts that effect times the estimated coefficient on capacity in the
employment equation (0.623).Similarly, line 2a shows the direct effect of changing
utilization on output growth, holding constant capacity, while line 2b subtracts the (near-
zero) coefficient on utilization in the employment equation. The interaction effects of
vintage and time with capacity are grouped together on lines lc and id under capacity, and
simibrly the interaction effect of time with utilization is shown on line 2c, while the heat
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The results in Table 11 can be combined in different ways to provide a sumxnaiy of
the causes of the productivity problems of the coal-using steam-electric plants. Oneuseful
technique is to divide the causes into three categories, (1) "exogenous" factors including
higher fuel prices and macroeconomic business cycles that have caused changes in
utilization, (2) "technical design' factors that influence the employment requirements of new
equipment, including capacity, heat rate, units, and vintage, and (3) "operating" factors that
cause changes in labor requirements on existing equipmentrepresented in our equation by
the time effect. As we shall see below, there is substantial interaction between (2) and (3),
since extra labor hired on existing equipment may be required to repair problems resulting
from design flaws.The following is the breakdown of the factors associated with the
productivity slowdown:
Slowdown,
The first decade is somewhat unusual, as the "vintage averaging" procedure cuts Out all pre-
1948 observations and leaves a small and atypical sample of plants in 1948, the first year of
observation. Somewhat more instructive is the comparison between the second and the
average of the third and fourth periods, i.e., between 1958-68 and1968-87. The total
house Unit #1 with his much more reliable and less labor-intensive GeneralElectric Unit
#2. On the same Westinghouse unit the turbine blades had a tendency tokeep 'falling
oUt.as The interviews of negative outliers revealed only one instance of a supercritical
boiler, adding further evidence that few if any supercritical boilers achieved a highlevel of
labor productivity.
Advances in metallur', which have been credited for allowing larger scaleand
higher temperatures and pressures, apparently were unable to keep ahead of theneeds of
plant designers.Wally Ghilani of the Harrison plant cited leaks, overheating, and
"fishmouth stress' in his supercritical boilers, as well as the complexityintroduced by "so
many relays, so much protection" that the problem offalse alarms was "phenomenal.' Paul
Wade of Btill Run also reported gas leaks, which he attributed to 'phasedpressurized
furnaces,' 'a design that we learned just didn't work." Cathcart of HomerCity described
considerable extra maintenance connected with "tears in casing" that wererelated to high
furnace pressure.
Most managers agreed that economies of scale had been exhausted.As shown above
in Table 4, the average capacity of new plants reached a plateau at 850MW by 1972-74 and
increased little after that. Carl Higgs of La Cynge felt that the optimalsize of a single unit
ntcrect"glWestinghouse officials attribute part of their problems to inadequate research and
development espenditures in the 1960s. See "The Turbine Troubles that Plague Westinghouse,"Business Week,
Aprii 6,1984, pp.54-55.
Another case is the Harrison (WV) plant, which is labelled here erroneously as anegative outlier only
because the government data source greatly understated employment in threeof the five years 1983-87 (as
reported above).
1948-58 1958-68 1968-78 1978-87
1958-68 to
1968-87
Exogenous 3.35-0.45-1.90 1.43 0.13
Technical Design 6.36534-2.55-2.26-7.95
Operating 1.10 1.10-0.10-0.10-1.20
Other + Residual Error -1.98-1. 2.67 0.583.12
Equals: Actual Productivity Change 8.834.75-1.88-0.35-5.91
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The interviews revealed substantial evidence of the reversal of vintage-specific
technical improvements in the late 1960s and 1970s. The most common feature of the
interviews was the uniform report that the technical advance in the 1960s to "supercritical"
units (having a pressure of more than 3200 pounds per square inch) had encountered an
unanticipated economic barrier. These units cost too much to build and to maintain, and
by 1977-78 subcritical designs were once again the dominant form of new installations (see
the discussion in Part ifi above).
Plant managers were outspoken in condemning supercritical units. In comparing his
1973 supercritical unit to his earlier and sm2ller subcritical units, Jim Smith of the Gaston
(AL) plant (pos. 82) commented that the newer unit "blows real crud" that adds substantial
maintenance expense. The earlier units are easier to maintain and produce 'no filth." Plant
manager Cathcart of the Homer City (PA) plant (pos. 82) reportedthat the supercritical
units had been introduced in the early 1960s as the next step in the technical progression
that had steadily increased thermal efficiency. But they brought with them "complex valving"
with an associated "burden of maintenance."Equipment designers had planned the
supereritical units in a "laboratozy and had not anticipated the effects of cold and hot
weather and of fly ash. The real world is not a laboratory." James Morrison of the Mercer
(NJ) plant (pos. 82) commented that most companies had experienced a poor operating
record with supercritical units, with a "forced outage rate higher than anticipated." Carl
Higgs of the La Cynge (MO) plant (pos. 82) contrasted his "supertroublesome" Westing-
productivity slowdown of 5.91 percentage points at an annual rate is overexplained by the
design and operating factors, with virtually no role for the exogenous utilization factor.
Vi. FIRM AND ESTABLISHMENT EFFECTS
This section provides an evaluation of establishment and firm effects. We are
interested in determining whether a specification error occurs when the employment
equations omit variables with establishment structure, and whether there are firm effects
beyond those associated with the regional, fuel, and construction-type dummy variables in
the basic specification. The estimation of establishment and firm effects also allows us to
deal with the possibility of simultaneity in the employment regressions. While the basic
assumption that capacity and output are exogenous in the short run seems convincing, there
may be cases where maintenance problems or other factors cause a plant to be taken
temporarily out of operation, leading to a simultaneous reduction in employment and
output. The exogenous demand would then be satisfied by other plants owned by the firm
or by purchases of power from other firms, leading to negative correlation of residuals
among plants of a given firm. Another type of "firm effect" would occur if firms operate
with different managerial procedures that yíeld consistently good or poor productivity
performance.
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where i indexes individual establishment observations observed at each time period t; there
is a vector of K explanatory variables xexplaining each observation Yù. and the e are a
set of independent and identically distributed disturbances with zero expectation and a finite
variance.The previously estimated employment and fuel use equations (2 and 5) share
the feature of (6) that the /3k coefficients are assumed to be identical for all establishments
and time periods (except that we have allowed for a vintage shift effect); and that our
equations include one or more time trends.
An initial question involves the possible existence of individual establishment effects.
Employment in a given establishment might be higher or lower year after year than can be
explained by the included xvariables, and such an effect could bias any of the estimated
coefficients. An establishment effect exists if there is a determinant of establishment
employment that has the same value for a given establishment in all time periods but whose
value differs between establishments.
The analysis of establishment effects begins by taking the mean over time of the
general linear specification in (6). This provides a structural relationship between the mean
of the dependent variable over time for each establishment and the means of the right-hand
variables over time for each establishment:
26. This exposition adapts for time-series purposes the approach developed within the cross-section context
by Pakes (1983).I am grateful to Ariel Pakes for his help in developing this exposition.
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in 1987 all utility plants in Oklahoma must use 10 percent Oklahoma-mined coal, requiring
another feed belt and new automatic controls for blending the Oklahoma coal with the
Wyoming coal that was previously used exclusively. Perhaps the extreme case of minimal
impact of environmental regulations is the Anclote (FL) plant (neg. 90), which has no
pollution control equipment and manages the burden of obtaining 'innumerable permits'
and training about regulations with a fixed and relatively small staff.
How do these anecdotes compare with the magnitude of the "time shift' effect
displayed above for the employment equations? To take the equation for coal-using plants
with vintage averaging (Table 7, col. 2), there was a shift in the time coefficient from -0.019
for 1948-67 to + 0.026 for 1968-87, for a net deterioration of 0.045 points per year. This
would imply that by 1987 fully 85 percent of additional employment could be attributed to
the time shift effect. Since no plant manager cited work force additions connected with
pollution control equipment exceeding 25 percent, at a maximum one could attribute only
about one-third of the time shift effect to environmental legislation, and probably less. This
leaves the remainder to be attributed to data errors, unanticipated maintenance, and other
undetermined causes. A hint of one of these causes was provided by Jerry Chambers of the
Stout (IN) plant (neg. 90), who described an overall shift toward a less productive and more
careful response to events: 'l've been doing this for 26-27 years. In those days our main
concern was making electricity. If you had a leak, you'd pull off the insulation, patch it, and
the repair would be done. Now, you have to call in a contractor to take air samples, you
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equipment At the first unit, installed in 1973, local high sulfur (5 percent) coal was used,
and a "tail-end scrubber' was installed. This required "probably 40-45 people" (25 percent
of the average 1974-75 work force) for operations and maintenance» On the second unit,
installed in 1977, low sulfur coal was used, and an electrostatic precipitator instead of a
scrubber was included. Extra maintenance requirements of the precipitator are claimed to
be only a single person. The tradeoff involves a much higher cost of coal for the second
unit. At the Sommers (TX) plant (pos. 82) scrubbers installed after 1978 are cited as a
"high cost maintenance item" that create "sludge that is hard to get rid of." Plant manager
Jerry Godwin at the San Juan (NM) plant (pos. 82) reported that scrubbers had been
installed on all four of the units installed between 1973 and 1982, as well as a '$93,000,000
zero-discharge water management system," and that fully 17 percent of the level of electric
rates charged by his company could be attributed to the expenses of air and water pollution
control.
Tony Leavitte of the Gardner (NV) plant (pos. 90) attributed the employment of 50-
60 people of his 275-person workforce, or 18-22 percent, to environmental regulations.
These include not only the operation and maintenance of scrubbers, but also water
treatment "evaporation ponds? Bob Arambel of the Naugbton (WY) plant attributed only
5 percent of employment to environmental regulations, this smaller number reflects the fact
that only one of his three units has a scrubber.
A uniquely local form of regulation was cited by Ron Kilman of Sooner. Beginning
34. The La Cygne plant is the subject of Weaver (1975), which highlights the unanticipated maintenance
problems created by scrubbers.
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Then the explanation of individual establishment employment (ye) is decomposed into
establishment-mean effect and a time-specific effect for each plant. Subtracting (7) from
we obtain:
EP(x-)+c. (8)
The issue to be explored is the correlation of the individual establishment effects with the
mean characteristics of each establishment averaged over time.We investigate the
hypothesis that there are establishment effects that are correlated with establishment mean
characteristics. The remaining variance of ß is associated with an independent establish-




The #k establishment effect parameters can be estimated directly, and an "establishment
effect" is said to occur when the #k parameters are different from zero. Substituting (9) into




The 'establishment effect" () parameters capture the correlation between average plant
employment and the average values over time of the other right-hand variables, including
capacity, utilization, heat rate, units, vintage, time, and the dummy variables for location,
type of fuel, and type of construction. The 13k parameters estimate the remaining response
of employment to a unit change in a right-hand variable within a given time period, given
the 'establishment effect' parameters.Thus thek parameters can bethought of as
'permanent" effects of changes in the explanatory variables, and the /3k parameters can be
treated as 'transitor)" effects?
By definition, since the vintage observation of a given plant is fixed over time, the
vintage trend must be a between-establishment effect, while all the variance of the time-
trend occurs over time and must then be a within-establishment effect. A plausible outcome
for the other coefficients in (10) would be to find that thekbetween-establishment
parameters capture all of the influence on employment of capacity, heat rate, and the
number of units, while the /3 within-establishment parameters capture the influence from
year to year of the utilization and time-trend variables. As is evident from columns (2) and
27. The specification written in (10) does not represent the only possible method of estimating the th5
establishment parameters. Pakes (1983) suggests a two step procedure in which one estimates first (6) and then
(8), obtaining theestimates as the difference in the & estimates from the two stages. But the estimation of
(10) directly is both simpier and yields a direct estimate of the standard errors of the thk parameters.
affected labor productivity at generating plants by forcing plants to shift from high-sulfur to
low-sulfur fuel having lower energy content, thus requiring more fuel to be handled per unit
of electricity output. Most plants had to install additional capital equipment in the form of
electrostatic precipitators or scrubbers, which substantially raised capital cost and also
required the addition of maintenance employees. The effects of environmental regulations
differ widely in their impact on each plant due to differing emissions standards in different
regions (Gollop-Roberts, 1985), different rules applied to plants of different vintages, and
variations in the emissions-creating characteristics of the three fuels (coal, gas, and oil).
Among our outlier plants the most common air pollution control device is one or
more electrostatic precipitators, installed at seven of the 12 plants in the early group and
eight of the 12 in the later group (which also contained two plants with scrubbers and two
with no emissions control equipment). Although some managers claimed that precipitators
were not a major extra source of maintenance employment requirements, 35-40 extra
people, or 12-13 percent of the work force, were attributed to precipitators at the Gallatin
(TN) plant (pos. 82). There first-generation precipitators had proven tobe inadequate when
emissions requirements were raised from the 95 to the 99 percent level, and new equipment
four times as large had to be installed. The need for a quantum jump in the size of
precipitators was augmented by the widespread shift to low-sulfur coal. Apparently this type
of fuel requires extra precipitator capacity.
At the La Cynge (MO) plant (pos. 82), vintage 1973, two units of roughly the same
size experienced quite different employment requirements connected with air pollution
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1980s without any further change in capacftyIn this particular case employment
overshot and was thereafter steaily reduced by attrition to about 725 in 1990.
Unhappy experiences were reported by Don Wilson of the 1971-vintage Mohave
plant. A steam pipe explosion cut output for 1985 almost in half from the average of 1984
and 1986. Unanticipated problems with turbine blades caused substantial shutdowns while
the turbine rotors were rebuilt?Related to the role of unanticipated maintenance
problems was the shifting division of responsibilities between equipment manufacturers and
utilities for trouble-shooting and retrofitting. Guy Pepipone reported that "we're not getting
as much help from manufacturers as we used to," and he and others attributed this to
financial tightness at the manufacturing firms which were faced with a dearth of orders for
new equipment after the mid-1970s. Bob Arambel of the Naughton (WY) plant (neg.90)
cited maintenance problems with a coal-pulverizing unit that was "underdesigned" with a
firebox that was too smell, causing the unit to operate at a too high a velocity and develop
"boiler tube erosion."
Environmental Regulations
The most plausible cause of the adverse time shift effect in our employment
regressions is the role of environmental regulations, which fell on electric utilities more
heavily than any other industry.Standards for emissions standards dating back to 1970
These were early examples of a new generation of Babcock and Wilcox boilers, and numbers 6 and 7
were supercritical (see below).
The increased size of units created substantial problems with turbine blades, as documented by Hirsch
(1989, pp. 105-8).
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(3) of Table 12, however, this sharp dichotomy turns out to be true only for the utili7'tion
variable. Capacity and heat rate have both between and within effects, while the coefficients
on the number of units are insignificant. The within-establishment effects of capacity and
heat rate suggest that additions and retirements of equipment are important causes of
changes in employment over time for a given establishment.
Allowing for Firm Effects
The variance in employment can be decomposed into three components, that is,
within-establishment-across-time, across-establishments-withinfirms, and across firms. One
possible type of firm effect might be cross-plant sharing of maintenance or management
labor. This is essentially an errors-in-variable problem, in the sense that if employees at one
plant are doing maintenance for one or more other plants, the level of capacity relevant for
the explanation of employment is incorrectly measured.
We can rewrite the basic specification, altering (6) to let j index firms, and i index
establishments within firms. Then (6) becomes:
Now we define establishment means over time and firm means over establishments as
=




We now define the establishment effect as in the above analysis,
K
+ E4kk + (14)
k
and firm effects by analogy:
P01= PO+E0kxfr+I. (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (11), we obtain an equation that can provide direct estimates
of the establishment and firm effects.
r r r
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The three right-hand columns in Table 12 exhibit the coefficient estimates for the
three-way decomposition of within-establishment, between-establishment, and between-firm
effects. The ßk coefficients for the within-establishment effects in column (4) are very close
to those in column (2). The between-establishment coefficients in column (5) are basically
similar to those in column (3), although the capacity coefficient rises from zero to a
(16)
jump in employment in the 1977-78 period was explained by the installation of new units
that were actually completed in 1979 or 1980, after the end of the sample period. If also
true after the end of the extended 1948-87 sample period, this factor could account for part
of the time shift effect.
7.Plant Configuration.Another omitted determinant of employment was identified
by Ron Kilman of the Sooner plant. Units of a given size boiler and generator can be fitted
with coal silos of different sizes, and small-sized silos of the type at his plant must be refilled
every 6-8 hours, as contrasted with other plants of the same size fitted with '24-hour" silos.
Misgauged Maintenance Burden
A consistent explanation of rising employment relative to capacity was the incorrect
anticipation of maintenance requirements.Staffing levels were increased when it was
discovered that "the previous force wasn't adoquate" and when 'deferred maintenance began
to build up." This factor would not tend to contribute to our time shift coefficients if it had
operated consistently over the postwar period, but it appears to have been concentrated in
post-1968 plants.An example of the contribution of maintenance to the time shift
coefficient is reported by Guy Pepipone of the Sammis (OH) plant (pos. 90).After
installation of seven units over the period 1959-71, employment at his plant had remained
at the 450 level through 1978. But then critical maintenance problems began to develop
with units 5, 6, and 7 (vintages 1966-71), and employment ballooned to 860 by the early
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The plant is in Page, Arizona, near the Arizona-Utah line and east of the Grand Canyon.
It faces three separate problems that are directly related to its location. First, its employees
run the plant's own railroad to move coal 78 miles from the mine.This factor alone
accounts for 100 extra employees. Second, the plant is 300 miles from both Phoenix and Salt
Lake City and cannot rely on outside contractors for special maintenance functions. Thus,
an undetermined part of its excess staff is explained by the need to include sufficient
maintenance employees to handle virtually any conceivable job. A related factor is the
dependence of the area on the plant, so that any outage must be repaired more promptly
than "plants in the east." Third, the environmental regulations in that area are particularly
demanding. Isolation is indirectly related to the high level of employment at the Mohave
(NV) plant (pos. 90), due to the use of "slurry" (liquid-form) coal brought in by pipeline.
The mechanical process of extracting the water from the coal not only requires extra
operating workers, but also "wears the heck out of everything," thus requiring extra
maintenance personnel, according to assistant plant manager Don Wilson.
Old Building. The data do not distinguish between the vintage of the structure
and the vintage of the equipment. Mr. Decker, the Kearney (NJ) plant manager (pos. 82),
attributed part of his high employment level to the fact that his steam equipment, of which
52 percent of the current capacity was installed in 1953 and the rest in 1926, was housed in
a 1926 building, which required "more maintenance" than a postwar buildingof similar size.
New Units After Sample Period. In the cases of two plants in the early group, a
marginally significant 0.071, and the negative utilization effect becomes significant. This
apparently perverse utilization effect means that a plant having a high average utilization
rate has a relatively high level of plant productivity, and this correlation may be induced by
reverse causation, since high-productivity plants are likely to be the "base load' plants that
experience the highest utilization rates.
A broader evaluation of Table 12 yields a mixed verdict on the inclusion of the
establishment and firm effects. On the one hand, both effects are clearly significant, as is
obvious from the high estimated t ratios.Also, a Chow test for the inclusion of the
establishment effect in co1iimnc (3) and (4) yields a F(4,2969) ratio of 7.8, compared to a
one percent critical value of 3.32. A test for the inclusion of the firm effect in addition to
the establishment effect yields a F(8,2965) ratio of 432, compared to a one percent critical
value of 2.5. On the other hand, the inclusion of the establishment and firm effects does
not change any of our previous conclusions regarding the central vintage shift and time shift
coefficients. For instance, the vintage shift coefficient in column (1) for the basic equation
is 0.046 and is reducedonlyto 0.044 in the full equation in column (5).
VII. A SURVEY OF TMOUTL1 ERTM PLANTS
Our decomposition of the productivity slowdown at the end of part V provides a
catalogue of factors which, while they help to explain the slowdown, themselves are in need
of explanation. To report that productivity growth decelerated because capacity growth
decelerated, the heat rate increased, and because there were 'vintage shifts' and 'time shifts'
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is not very helpful unless we can begin to understand why these adverse events occurred.
In this section we attempt to learn something about the industry's problems from
those most closely involved, the plant managers themselves. The technique is simply to
telephone the managers of plants with the largest positive and negative residual errors on
average during the last five years of the sample period, in order to learn about their own
explanation of the relatively high or low level of employment at their plants.These
telephone calls are useful not just in isolating "special factors' that require unusually high
levels of employment at some plants, but also in obtaining a set of explanations for the
behavior of some of our explanatory variables, particularly capacity, utilization, and heat
rate, and the roles of environmental legislation and the "depletion hypothesis" in contributing
to that behavior.
Characteristics of Ouiller Plants
The telephone interviews were carried out in two steps, once in 1982 for the first
draft of this paper, and again in 1990 when the research was updated.In the early
interviews outliers were chosen as those with the highest or lowest residuals (actual minus
fitted) in the last five years of the sample period, then 1974-78. In the early interviews only
positive outliers were telephoned, reflecting our interest in the disappointing productivity
performance of the industry. This asymmetry was partly corrected in the second batch of
interviews, where more negative than positive outliers were telephoned.
28. The interviews were conducted October 11.18, 1982, and July 9-12,1990.
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plant managers were questioned about joint maintenance and whether they imported or
exported employees. The most common pattern was sharing across plants within the firm
with no implications for the regression results if imports of employees for the subject plant's
overhaul period are balanced by exports of employees to service other plants. Ron Kilman
of the Sooner (OK) plant (pos. 90) stated that he sometimes exported 4-10 employees for
minor overhauls and 20-25 for major overhauls, out of a total staff of 220. Melanie Adams-
Miller of the Anclote (FL) plant (neg. 90) gets along withonlyabout half the predicted
number of employees, partly because her firm has a traveling maintenance crew of 100-120
people who perform overhauls on her plant. Similarly, shift supervisor Wally Ghilani of the
Harrison (WV) plant (neg. 90) reports that major maintenance at his plant is performed by
"mobile maintenance gangs" employed by a specialist service firm, not by his own utility.
Guy Pepipone of the Sammis (OH) plant (pos. 90) was the only manager reporting a major
component of employees who performanced seÑices for other plants in the same firm; in
his case fully 30 percent of the employees perform engineering and planning services on a
per-service fee basis.
4. Isolated location. In the later group seven of the 15 positive outliers, and none
of the negative outliers, are located in five mountain-region states (Nevada, Arizona, New
Mexico, Wyoming, and Montana), largely because isolated plants are required to be more
self-sufficient. The role of this and other omitted variables related to isolation can be
illustrated by the example of a consistent top-five outlier, the Navajo (AZ) plant (pos. 82).
The 1974-vintage plant is listed as having 615 employees in contrast to the predicted levelOmission of Variables
Some, but not all, of the plant managers seemed aware that the level of employment
at their plants was "relatively high" or "relatively low" and had readyexplanations, always
involving additional factors that were not identified in the data set. An examination of the
following list of factors is somewhat disturbing for the econometrician, in that it suggests
that the list of "left-out" variables assembled from a complete set of interviews might exhaust
the available degrees of freedom even in this rich data set:
I. Gas Turbine Unit. Three of the plant managers reported that their employment
rolls included people involved in operating and maintaining gas turbine capacity that is not
included in the basic data source which covers only steam units. As it happens, all three of
these pre-1968 plants added the gas turbine capacity in 1968 or afterward, thus contributing
to the significance of the positive 1968-78 time shift coefficient. In every case gasturbine
units are used for peaking purposes but nevertheless can add a significant number of
employees.
Joi'u Products. The Warwick (IN) plant was built jointly with an Alcoa aluminum
smelter and on average 85 percent of the plant's electric output goes to the smelter rather
than to other electric company customers. The particular location and identity of the
principal customer would not be important if it were not for the fact that theplant's
employment register includes an unspecified number providing specific services to Alcoa,
including steam and water treatment services.
Joint Maintenance and Engineering Services. In the later group of interviews all
Summary data on the outlier plants are provided in Table 13. The early group of
plants displays systematic differences, in that the positive outliers are newer and larger than
the negative outliers.In the early group eight of the 17 positive outliers had vintages of
1968 or newer, while none of the negative outliers were post-1968 in vintage (and seven of
the 12 were vintage 1950 or earlier). The early group also appears to display a somewhat
skewed distribution, in that the average log residual for positive outliers is much larger than
for negative outliers. The later group of outliers displays more similarity between the
positive and negative averages, with roughly the same average vintage arid less skewness?
Eight of the positive outliers and nine of the negative outliers are post.1968 in vintage.
There is still a tendency, however, for the positive outlier plants to be larger than the
negative outlier plants.3°
The residuals used to choose the early group of outliers come from the original
employment equation in Table 6, column (1), estimated for the period 1948.78. The later
group come from the same equation, estimated for the period 1948-87,and the facts
reported in the rest of this paragraph refer to the more recent results.The estimated
coefficients in the regression for the complete sample period excluding the 30 outlier plants
There is substantial turnover in the group of positive outliers:of the 17 plants in the early group
identified from data ending in 1978, only five appear in the list of positive outliers based on average residuals
during 1983-87. Of the other 12 plants, six disappeared from the data set or changed their identity when small
adjacent plants were consolidated and the average residual for the remaining six in 1983-87 was only 0.12. None
of the early group of negative outliers reappeared in the later group.
Why are positive outliers more likely to be large plants? One reason is that large plants are more likely
to have supercritical boilers, a technolor that (as we see below) led to unanticipated maintenance requirements
that raised employment. Rose-Joskow (1990) have studied the diffusion of innovation in the industzy and
conclude that larger firms were more likely to adopt supercritical units.
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standard error declines as the outliers are excluded, from 0.373 to 0348; the unexplained
variance is reduced by 22 percent by the exclusion of 8 percent of the plants. The main
coefficients of interest, the vintage and time effects and their 1968-78 shifts, change little.
The absence of any important change in the 1968-87 year shift effect implies that the role
of the outlier plants constructed before 1968 is to raise the residual error in all years, and
not to contribute an unexplained increase in employment after 1968.
As indicated in Table 13, 24 plant managers were contacted, 12 in the early group
and 12 in the late group.No individual refused to enter into a discussion. The only
limitation on completeness of coverage was the author's own time. There seems to be no
other reason in principle why coverage could not be extended to all the outliers or, indeed,
to the full sample of plants.3' In the following analysis of the interviews, plant managers
in the early or later groups, and the sign of the residual error, are distinguished by (pos. 82),
(pos. 90), or (neg. 90).
Role of Employees and Extent of Data Errors
An important aspect of the survey is the emphasis by respondents on equipment
characteristics and reliability as primary determinants of workforce size and composition.
This corroborates the basic distinction in much of the electric utility literature between "ex
31. In the early interviews an attempt was made to contact all 17 plants, and plants were excluded only when
repeated attempts failed to reach the plant manager. The plants for the later interviews were selected at random,
in the sense that one or more phone calls were placed to every plant on the list of 30. The first 12 plants where
the plant manager could be contacted were included; the rest are excluded because of no answer, busy signala,
managers who were in meetings or on vacation.
ante" investment decisions and "ex post" operating decisions, the latter allowing plant
managers little freedom to deviate from fixed capital-energy-labor input ratios. Indeed, a
striking feature of the data is the tendency for a given plant to experience the same capacity,
heat rate, and employment for several years and sometimes decades, with utilization being
the only variable experiencing marked year-to-year fluctuations.
The first step in each telephone call was to verify the basic information contained in
our data file on plant vintage, units, capacity, and employment. Managers were questioned
closely in cases where employment had increased noticeably in the last five years of the
sample period without an increase in capacity. In every case but one where a discrepancy
was reported, the error could be traced to the government document that provides the
source data.
What do plant employees do? Paul Wade at the Bull Run (TN) 1967-vintage TVA
plant (pos. 82) decomposed his 1982 work force of 227 people as consisting of 70 involved
in maintenance, 55 in operations, 50 in coal handling, 25 in specialized work involving
instruments and water quality control, and 15 in adnilnictrative capacities (this accounts for
215 of the 227). 22 percent of the work force is cited as being involved in coal handling,
very close to the estimated 23 percent employment penalty of coal plants relative to gas
plants in column (1) of Table 6. Confirmation of this figure also comes from Tim Lovette
of the Danskhammer (NY) plant (pos. 90), which shifted from oil and gas to coal in 1986-87
and was forced to raise employment from 101 to 126 as a result.
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standard error declines as the outliers are excluded, from 0.373 to 0348; the unexplained
variance is reduced by 22 percent by the exclusion of 8 percent of the plants. The main
coefficients of interest, the vintage and time effects and their 1968-78 shifts, change little.
The absence of any important change in the 1968-87 year shift effect implies that the role
of the outlier plants constructed before 1968 is to raise the residual error in all years, and
not to contribute an unexplained increase in employment after 1968.
As indicated in Table 13, 24 plant managers were contacted, 12 in the early group
and 12 in the late group.No individual refused to enter into a discussion. The only
limitation on completeness of coverage was the author's own time. There seems to be no
other reason in principle why coverage could not be extended to all the outliers or, indeed,
to the full sample of plants.3' In the following analysis of the interviews, plant managers
in the early or later groups, and the sign of the residual error, are distinguished by (pos. 82),
(pos. 90), or (neg. 90).
Role of Employees and Extent of Data Errors
An important aspect of the survey is the emphasis by respondents on equipment
characteristics and reliability as primary determinants of workforce size and composition.
This corroborates the basic distinction in much of the electric utility literature between "ex
31. In the early interviews an attempt was made to contact all 17 plants, and plants were excluded only when
repeated attempts failed to reach the plant manager. The plants for the later interviews were selected at random,
in the sense that one or more phone calls were placed to every plant on the list of 30. The first 12 plants where
the plant manager could be contacted were included; the rest are excluded because of no answer, busy signala,
managers who were in meetings or on vacation.
ante" investment decisions and "ex post" operating decisions, the latter allowing plant
managers little freedom to deviate from fixed capital-energy-labor input ratios. Indeed, a
striking feature of the data is the tendency for a given plant to experience the same capacity,
heat rate, and employment for several years and sometimes decades, with utilization being
the only variable experiencing marked year-to-year fluctuations.
The first step in each telephone call was to verify the basic information contained in
our data file on plant vintage, units, capacity, and employment. Managers were questioned
closely in cases where employment had increased noticeably in the last five years of the
sample period without an increase in capacity. In every case but one where a discrepancy
was reported, the error could be traced to the government document that provides the
source data.
What do plant employees do? Paul Wade at the Bull Run (TN) 1967-vintage TVA
plant (pos. 82) decomposed his 1982 work force of 227 people as consisting of 70 involved
in maintenance, 55 in operations, 50 in coal handling, 25 in specialized work involving
instruments and water quality control, and 15 in adnilnictrative capacities (this accounts for
215 of the 227). 22 percent of the work force is cited as being involved in coal handling,
very close to the estimated 23 percent employment penalty of coal plants relative to gas
plants in column (1) of Table 6. Confirmation of this figure also comes from Tim Lovette
of the Danskhammer (NY) plant (pos. 90), which shifted from oil and gas to coal in 1986-87
and was forced to raise employment from 101 to 126 as a result.
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Some, but not all, of the plant managers seemed aware that the level of employment
at their plants was "relatively high" or "relatively low" and had readyexplanations, always
involving additional factors that were not identified in the data set. An examination of the
following list of factors is somewhat disturbing for the econometrician, in that it suggests
that the list of "left-out" variables assembled from a complete set of interviews might exhaust
the available degrees of freedom even in this rich data set:
I. Gas Turbine Unit. Three of the plant managers reported that their employment
rolls included people involved in operating and maintaining gas turbine capacity that is not
included in the basic data source which covers only steam units. As it happens, all three of
these pre-1968 plants added the gas turbine capacity in 1968 or afterward, thus contributing
to the significance of the positive 1968-78 time shift coefficient. In every case gasturbine
units are used for peaking purposes but nevertheless can add a significant number of
employees.
Joi'u Products. The Warwick (IN) plant was built jointly with an Alcoa aluminum
smelter and on average 85 percent of the plant's electric output goes to the smelter rather
than to other electric company customers. The particular location and identity of the
principal customer would not be important if it were not for the fact that theplant's
employment register includes an unspecified number providing specific services to Alcoa,
including steam and water treatment services.
Joint Maintenance and Engineering Services. In the later group of interviews all
Summary data on the outlier plants are provided in Table 13. The early group of
plants displays systematic differences, in that the positive outliers are newer and larger than
the negative outliers.In the early group eight of the 17 positive outliers had vintages of
1968 or newer, while none of the negative outliers were post-1968 in vintage (and seven of
the 12 were vintage 1950 or earlier). The early group also appears to display a somewhat
skewed distribution, in that the average log residual for positive outliers is much larger than
for negative outliers. The later group of outliers displays more similarity between the
positive and negative averages, with roughly the same average vintage arid less skewness?
Eight of the positive outliers and nine of the negative outliers are post.1968 in vintage.
There is still a tendency, however, for the positive outlier plants to be larger than the
negative outlier plants.3°
The residuals used to choose the early group of outliers come from the original
employment equation in Table 6, column (1), estimated for the period 1948.78. The later
group come from the same equation, estimated for the period 1948-87,and the facts
reported in the rest of this paragraph refer to the more recent results.The estimated
coefficients in the regression for the complete sample period excluding the 30 outlier plants
There is substantial turnover in the group of positive outliers:of the 17 plants in the early group
identified from data ending in 1978, only five appear in the list of positive outliers based on average residuals
during 1983-87. Of the other 12 plants, six disappeared from the data set or changed their identity when small
adjacent plants were consolidated and the average residual for the remaining six in 1983-87 was only 0.12. None
of the early group of negative outliers reappeared in the later group.
Why are positive outliers more likely to be large plants? One reason is that large plants are more likely
to have supercritical boilers, a technolor that (as we see below) led to unanticipated maintenance requirements
that raised employment. Rose-Joskow (1990) have studied the diffusion of innovation in the industzy and
conclude that larger firms were more likely to adopt supercritical units.
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is not very helpful unless we can begin to understand why these adverse events occurred.
In this section we attempt to learn something about the industry's problems from
those most closely involved, the plant managers themselves. The technique is simply to
telephone the managers of plants with the largest positive and negative residual errors on
average during the last five years of the sample period, in order to learn about their own
explanation of the relatively high or low level of employment at their plants.These
telephone calls are useful not just in isolating "special factors' that require unusually high
levels of employment at some plants, but also in obtaining a set of explanations for the
behavior of some of our explanatory variables, particularly capacity, utilization, and heat
rate, and the roles of environmental legislation and the "depletion hypothesis" in contributing
to that behavior.
Characteristics of Ouiller Plants
The telephone interviews were carried out in two steps, once in 1982 for the first
draft of this paper, and again in 1990 when the research was updated.In the early
interviews outliers were chosen as those with the highest or lowest residuals (actual minus
fitted) in the last five years of the sample period, then 1974-78. In the early interviews only
positive outliers were telephoned, reflecting our interest in the disappointing productivity
performance of the industry. This asymmetry was partly corrected in the second batch of
interviews, where more negative than positive outliers were telephoned.
28. The interviews were conducted October 11.18, 1982, and July 9-12,1990.
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plant managers were questioned about joint maintenance and whether they imported or
exported employees. The most common pattern was sharing across plants within the firm
with no implications for the regression results if imports of employees for the subject plant's
overhaul period are balanced by exports of employees to service other plants. Ron Kilman
of the Sooner (OK) plant (pos. 90) stated that he sometimes exported 4-10 employees for
minor overhauls and 20-25 for major overhauls, out of a total staff of 220. Melanie Adams-
Miller of the Anclote (FL) plant (neg. 90) gets along withonlyabout half the predicted
number of employees, partly because her firm has a traveling maintenance crew of 100-120
people who perform overhauls on her plant. Similarly, shift supervisor Wally Ghilani of the
Harrison (WV) plant (neg. 90) reports that major maintenance at his plant is performed by
"mobile maintenance gangs" employed by a specialist service firm, not by his own utility.
Guy Pepipone of the Sammis (OH) plant (pos. 90) was the only manager reporting a major
component of employees who performanced seÑices for other plants in the same firm; in
his case fully 30 percent of the employees perform engineering and planning services on a
per-service fee basis.
4. Isolated location. In the later group seven of the 15 positive outliers, and none
of the negative outliers, are located in five mountain-region states (Nevada, Arizona, New
Mexico, Wyoming, and Montana), largely because isolated plants are required to be more
self-sufficient. The role of this and other omitted variables related to isolation can be
illustrated by the example of a consistent top-five outlier, the Navajo (AZ) plant (pos. 82).
The 1974-vintage plant is listed as having 615 employees in contrast to the predicted levelof 146 in 1978, and by 1987 this had risen to 752 employees vs. a predicted level of 310.
The plant is in Page, Arizona, near the Arizona-Utah line and east of the Grand Canyon.
It faces three separate problems that are directly related to its location. First, its employees
run the plant's own railroad to move coal 78 miles from the mine.This factor alone
accounts for 100 extra employees. Second, the plant is 300 miles from both Phoenix and Salt
Lake City and cannot rely on outside contractors for special maintenance functions. Thus,
an undetermined part of its excess staff is explained by the need to include sufficient
maintenance employees to handle virtually any conceivable job. A related factor is the
dependence of the area on the plant, so that any outage must be repaired more promptly
than "plants in the east." Third, the environmental regulations in that area are particularly
demanding. Isolation is indirectly related to the high level of employment at the Mohave
(NV) plant (pos. 90), due to the use of "slurry" (liquid-form) coal brought in by pipeline.
The mechanical process of extracting the water from the coal not only requires extra
operating workers, but also "wears the heck out of everything," thus requiring extra
maintenance personnel, according to assistant plant manager Don Wilson.
Old Building. The data do not distinguish between the vintage of the structure
and the vintage of the equipment. Mr. Decker, the Kearney (NJ) plant manager (pos. 82),
attributed part of his high employment level to the fact that his steam equipment, of which
52 percent of the current capacity was installed in 1953 and the rest in 1926, was housed in
a 1926 building, which required "more maintenance" than a postwar buildingof similar size.
New Units After Sample Period. In the cases of two plants in the early group, a
marginally significant 0.071, and the negative utilization effect becomes significant. This
apparently perverse utilization effect means that a plant having a high average utilization
rate has a relatively high level of plant productivity, and this correlation may be induced by
reverse causation, since high-productivity plants are likely to be the "base load' plants that
experience the highest utilization rates.
A broader evaluation of Table 12 yields a mixed verdict on the inclusion of the
establishment and firm effects. On the one hand, both effects are clearly significant, as is
obvious from the high estimated t ratios.Also, a Chow test for the inclusion of the
establishment effect in co1iimnc (3) and (4) yields a F(4,2969) ratio of 7.8, compared to a
one percent critical value of 3.32. A test for the inclusion of the firm effect in addition to
the establishment effect yields a F(8,2965) ratio of 432, compared to a one percent critical
value of 2.5. On the other hand, the inclusion of the establishment and firm effects does
not change any of our previous conclusions regarding the central vintage shift and time shift
coefficients. For instance, the vintage shift coefficient in column (1) for the basic equation
is 0.046 and is reducedonlyto 0.044 in the full equation in column (5).
VII. A SURVEY OF TMOUTL1 ERTM PLANTS
Our decomposition of the productivity slowdown at the end of part V provides a
catalogue of factors which, while they help to explain the slowdown, themselves are in need
of explanation. To report that productivity growth decelerated because capacity growth
decelerated, the heat rate increased, and because there were 'vintage shifts' and 'time shifts'




We now define the establishment effect as in the above analysis,
K
+ E4kk + (14)
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and firm effects by analogy:
P01= PO+E0kxfr+I. (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (11), we obtain an equation that can provide direct estimates
of the establishment and firm effects.
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The three right-hand columns in Table 12 exhibit the coefficient estimates for the
three-way decomposition of within-establishment, between-establishment, and between-firm
effects. The ßk coefficients for the within-establishment effects in column (4) are very close
to those in column (2). The between-establishment coefficients in column (5) are basically
similar to those in column (3), although the capacity coefficient rises from zero to a
(16)
jump in employment in the 1977-78 period was explained by the installation of new units
that were actually completed in 1979 or 1980, after the end of the sample period. If also
true after the end of the extended 1948-87 sample period, this factor could account for part
of the time shift effect.
7.Plant Configuration.Another omitted determinant of employment was identified
by Ron Kilman of the Sooner plant. Units of a given size boiler and generator can be fitted
with coal silos of different sizes, and small-sized silos of the type at his plant must be refilled
every 6-8 hours, as contrasted with other plants of the same size fitted with '24-hour" silos.
Misgauged Maintenance Burden
A consistent explanation of rising employment relative to capacity was the incorrect
anticipation of maintenance requirements.Staffing levels were increased when it was
discovered that "the previous force wasn't adoquate" and when 'deferred maintenance began
to build up." This factor would not tend to contribute to our time shift coefficients if it had
operated consistently over the postwar period, but it appears to have been concentrated in
post-1968 plants.An example of the contribution of maintenance to the time shift
coefficient is reported by Guy Pepipone of the Sammis (OH) plant (pos. 90).After
installation of seven units over the period 1959-71, employment at his plant had remained
at the 450 level through 1978. But then critical maintenance problems began to develop
with units 5, 6, and 7 (vintages 1966-71), and employment ballooned to 860 by the early
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1980s without any further change in capacftyIn this particular case employment
overshot and was thereafter steaily reduced by attrition to about 725 in 1990.
Unhappy experiences were reported by Don Wilson of the 1971-vintage Mohave
plant. A steam pipe explosion cut output for 1985 almost in half from the average of 1984
and 1986. Unanticipated problems with turbine blades caused substantial shutdowns while
the turbine rotors were rebuilt?Related to the role of unanticipated maintenance
problems was the shifting division of responsibilities between equipment manufacturers and
utilities for trouble-shooting and retrofitting. Guy Pepipone reported that "we're not getting
as much help from manufacturers as we used to," and he and others attributed this to
financial tightness at the manufacturing firms which were faced with a dearth of orders for
new equipment after the mid-1970s. Bob Arambel of the Naughton (WY) plant (neg.90)
cited maintenance problems with a coal-pulverizing unit that was "underdesigned" with a
firebox that was too smell, causing the unit to operate at a too high a velocity and develop
"boiler tube erosion."
Environmental Regulations
The most plausible cause of the adverse time shift effect in our employment
regressions is the role of environmental regulations, which fell on electric utilities more
heavily than any other industry.Standards for emissions standards dating back to 1970
These were early examples of a new generation of Babcock and Wilcox boilers, and numbers 6 and 7
were supercritical (see below).
The increased size of units created substantial problems with turbine blades, as documented by Hirsch
(1989, pp. 105-8).
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(3) of Table 12, however, this sharp dichotomy turns out to be true only for the utili7'tion
variable. Capacity and heat rate have both between and within effects, while the coefficients
on the number of units are insignificant. The within-establishment effects of capacity and
heat rate suggest that additions and retirements of equipment are important causes of
changes in employment over time for a given establishment.
Allowing for Firm Effects
The variance in employment can be decomposed into three components, that is,
within-establishment-across-time, across-establishments-withinfirms, and across firms. One
possible type of firm effect might be cross-plant sharing of maintenance or management
labor. This is essentially an errors-in-variable problem, in the sense that if employees at one
plant are doing maintenance for one or more other plants, the level of capacity relevant for
the explanation of employment is incorrectly measured.
We can rewrite the basic specification, altering (6) to let j index firms, and i index
establishments within firms. Then (6) becomes:
Now we define establishment means over time and firm means over establishments as
=




The 'establishment effect" () parameters capture the correlation between average plant
employment and the average values over time of the other right-hand variables, including
capacity, utilization, heat rate, units, vintage, time, and the dummy variables for location,
type of fuel, and type of construction. The 13k parameters estimate the remaining response
of employment to a unit change in a right-hand variable within a given time period, given
the 'establishment effect' parameters.Thus thek parameters can bethought of as
'permanent" effects of changes in the explanatory variables, and the /3k parameters can be
treated as 'transitor)" effects?
By definition, since the vintage observation of a given plant is fixed over time, the
vintage trend must be a between-establishment effect, while all the variance of the time-
trend occurs over time and must then be a within-establishment effect. A plausible outcome
for the other coefficients in (10) would be to find that thekbetween-establishment
parameters capture all of the influence on employment of capacity, heat rate, and the
number of units, while the /3 within-establishment parameters capture the influence from
year to year of the utilization and time-trend variables. As is evident from columns (2) and
27. The specification written in (10) does not represent the only possible method of estimating the th5
establishment parameters. Pakes (1983) suggests a two step procedure in which one estimates first (6) and then
(8), obtaining theestimates as the difference in the & estimates from the two stages. But the estimation of
(10) directly is both simpier and yields a direct estimate of the standard errors of the thk parameters.
affected labor productivity at generating plants by forcing plants to shift from high-sulfur to
low-sulfur fuel having lower energy content, thus requiring more fuel to be handled per unit
of electricity output. Most plants had to install additional capital equipment in the form of
electrostatic precipitators or scrubbers, which substantially raised capital cost and also
required the addition of maintenance employees. The effects of environmental regulations
differ widely in their impact on each plant due to differing emissions standards in different
regions (Gollop-Roberts, 1985), different rules applied to plants of different vintages, and
variations in the emissions-creating characteristics of the three fuels (coal, gas, and oil).
Among our outlier plants the most common air pollution control device is one or
more electrostatic precipitators, installed at seven of the 12 plants in the early group and
eight of the 12 in the later group (which also contained two plants with scrubbers and two
with no emissions control equipment). Although some managers claimed that precipitators
were not a major extra source of maintenance employment requirements, 35-40 extra
people, or 12-13 percent of the work force, were attributed to precipitators at the Gallatin
(TN) plant (pos. 82). There first-generation precipitators had proven tobe inadequate when
emissions requirements were raised from the 95 to the 99 percent level, and new equipment
four times as large had to be installed. The need for a quantum jump in the size of
precipitators was augmented by the widespread shift to low-sulfur coal. Apparently this type
of fuel requires extra precipitator capacity.
At the La Cynge (MO) plant (pos. 82), vintage 1973, two units of roughly the same
size experienced quite different employment requirements connected with air pollution
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equipment At the first unit, installed in 1973, local high sulfur (5 percent) coal was used,
and a "tail-end scrubber' was installed. This required "probably 40-45 people" (25 percent
of the average 1974-75 work force) for operations and maintenance» On the second unit,
installed in 1977, low sulfur coal was used, and an electrostatic precipitator instead of a
scrubber was included. Extra maintenance requirements of the precipitator are claimed to
be only a single person. The tradeoff involves a much higher cost of coal for the second
unit. At the Sommers (TX) plant (pos. 82) scrubbers installed after 1978 are cited as a
"high cost maintenance item" that create "sludge that is hard to get rid of." Plant manager
Jerry Godwin at the San Juan (NM) plant (pos. 82) reported that scrubbers had been
installed on all four of the units installed between 1973 and 1982, as well as a '$93,000,000
zero-discharge water management system," and that fully 17 percent of the level of electric
rates charged by his company could be attributed to the expenses of air and water pollution
control.
Tony Leavitte of the Gardner (NV) plant (pos. 90) attributed the employment of 50-
60 people of his 275-person workforce, or 18-22 percent, to environmental regulations.
These include not only the operation and maintenance of scrubbers, but also water
treatment "evaporation ponds? Bob Arambel of the Naugbton (WY) plant attributed only
5 percent of employment to environmental regulations, this smaller number reflects the fact
that only one of his three units has a scrubber.
A uniquely local form of regulation was cited by Ron Kilman of Sooner. Beginning
34. The La Cygne plant is the subject of Weaver (1975), which highlights the unanticipated maintenance
problems created by scrubbers.
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Then the explanation of individual establishment employment (ye) is decomposed into
establishment-mean effect and a time-specific effect for each plant. Subtracting (7) from
we obtain:
EP(x-)+c. (8)
The issue to be explored is the correlation of the individual establishment effects with the
mean characteristics of each establishment averaged over time.We investigate the
hypothesis that there are establishment effects that are correlated with establishment mean
characteristics. The remaining variance of ß is associated with an independent establish-




The #k establishment effect parameters can be estimated directly, and an "establishment
effect" is said to occur when the #k parameters are different from zero. Substituting (9) into
and adding the resulting expression to (8), we obtain a relationship among theProductivity In Electricity Generation, Page 32
where i indexes individual establishment observations observed at each time period t; there
is a vector of K explanatory variables xexplaining each observation Yù. and the e are a
set of independent and identically distributed disturbances with zero expectation and a finite
variance.The previously estimated employment and fuel use equations (2 and 5) share
the feature of (6) that the /3k coefficients are assumed to be identical for all establishments
and time periods (except that we have allowed for a vintage shift effect); and that our
equations include one or more time trends.
An initial question involves the possible existence of individual establishment effects.
Employment in a given establishment might be higher or lower year after year than can be
explained by the included xvariables, and such an effect could bias any of the estimated
coefficients. An establishment effect exists if there is a determinant of establishment
employment that has the same value for a given establishment in all time periods but whose
value differs between establishments.
The analysis of establishment effects begins by taking the mean over time of the
general linear specification in (6). This provides a structural relationship between the mean
of the dependent variable over time for each establishment and the means of the right-hand
variables over time for each establishment:
26. This exposition adapts for time-series purposes the approach developed within the cross-section context
by Pakes (1983).I am grateful to Ariel Pakes for his help in developing this exposition.
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in 1987 all utility plants in Oklahoma must use 10 percent Oklahoma-mined coal, requiring
another feed belt and new automatic controls for blending the Oklahoma coal with the
Wyoming coal that was previously used exclusively. Perhaps the extreme case of minimal
impact of environmental regulations is the Anclote (FL) plant (neg. 90), which has no
pollution control equipment and manages the burden of obtaining 'innumerable permits'
and training about regulations with a fixed and relatively small staff.
How do these anecdotes compare with the magnitude of the "time shift' effect
displayed above for the employment equations? To take the equation for coal-using plants
with vintage averaging (Table 7, col. 2), there was a shift in the time coefficient from -0.019
for 1948-67 to + 0.026 for 1968-87, for a net deterioration of 0.045 points per year. This
would imply that by 1987 fully 85 percent of additional employment could be attributed to
the time shift effect. Since no plant manager cited work force additions connected with
pollution control equipment exceeding 25 percent, at a maximum one could attribute only
about one-third of the time shift effect to environmental legislation, and probably less. This
leaves the remainder to be attributed to data errors, unanticipated maintenance, and other
undetermined causes. A hint of one of these causes was provided by Jerry Chambers of the
Stout (IN) plant (neg. 90), who described an overall shift toward a less productive and more
careful response to events: 'l've been doing this for 26-27 years. In those days our main
concern was making electricity. If you had a leak, you'd pull off the insulation, patch it, and
the repair would be done. Now, you have to call in a contractor to take air samples, you
have to be inspected, and it takes two days to do what used to take two hours."Diminishing Returns to Technical Advance
The interviews revealed substantial evidence of the reversal of vintage-specific
technical improvements in the late 1960s and 1970s. The most common feature of the
interviews was the uniform report that the technical advance in the 1960s to "supercritical"
units (having a pressure of more than 3200 pounds per square inch) had encountered an
unanticipated economic barrier. These units cost too much to build and to maintain, and
by 1977-78 subcritical designs were once again the dominant form of new installations (see
the discussion in Part ifi above).
Plant managers were outspoken in condemning supercritical units. In comparing his
1973 supercritical unit to his earlier and sm2ller subcritical units, Jim Smith of the Gaston
(AL) plant (pos. 82) commented that the newer unit "blows real crud" that adds substantial
maintenance expense. The earlier units are easier to maintain and produce 'no filth." Plant
manager Cathcart of the Homer City (PA) plant (pos. 82) reportedthat the supercritical
units had been introduced in the early 1960s as the next step in the technical progression
that had steadily increased thermal efficiency. But they brought with them "complex valving"
with an associated "burden of maintenance."Equipment designers had planned the
supereritical units in a "laboratozy and had not anticipated the effects of cold and hot
weather and of fly ash. The real world is not a laboratory." James Morrison of the Mercer
(NJ) plant (pos. 82) commented that most companies had experienced a poor operating
record with supercritical units, with a "forced outage rate higher than anticipated." Carl
Higgs of the La Cynge (MO) plant (pos. 82) contrasted his "supertroublesome" Westing-
productivity slowdown of 5.91 percentage points at an annual rate is overexplained by the
design and operating factors, with virtually no role for the exogenous utilization factor.
Vi. FIRM AND ESTABLISHMENT EFFECTS
This section provides an evaluation of establishment and firm effects. We are
interested in determining whether a specification error occurs when the employment
equations omit variables with establishment structure, and whether there are firm effects
beyond those associated with the regional, fuel, and construction-type dummy variables in
the basic specification. The estimation of establishment and firm effects also allows us to
deal with the possibility of simultaneity in the employment regressions. While the basic
assumption that capacity and output are exogenous in the short run seems convincing, there
may be cases where maintenance problems or other factors cause a plant to be taken
temporarily out of operation, leading to a simultaneous reduction in employment and
output. The exogenous demand would then be satisfied by other plants owned by the firm
or by purchases of power from other firms, leading to negative correlation of residuals
among plants of a given firm. Another type of "firm effect" would occur if firms operate
with different managerial procedures that yíeld consistently good or poor productivity
performance.
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The results in Table 11 can be combined in different ways to provide a sumxnaiy of
the causes of the productivity problems of the coal-using steam-electric plants. Oneuseful
technique is to divide the causes into three categories, (1) "exogenous" factors including
higher fuel prices and macroeconomic business cycles that have caused changes in
utilization, (2) "technical design' factors that influence the employment requirements of new
equipment, including capacity, heat rate, units, and vintage, and (3) "operating" factors that
cause changes in labor requirements on existing equipmentrepresented in our equation by
the time effect. As we shall see below, there is substantial interaction between (2) and (3),
since extra labor hired on existing equipment may be required to repair problems resulting
from design flaws.The following is the breakdown of the factors associated with the
productivity slowdown:
Slowdown,
The first decade is somewhat unusual, as the "vintage averaging" procedure cuts Out all pre-
1948 observations and leaves a small and atypical sample of plants in 1948, the first year of
observation. Somewhat more instructive is the comparison between the second and the
average of the third and fourth periods, i.e., between 1958-68 and1968-87. The total
house Unit #1 with his much more reliable and less labor-intensive GeneralElectric Unit
#2. On the same Westinghouse unit the turbine blades had a tendency tokeep 'falling
oUt.as The interviews of negative outliers revealed only one instance of a supercritical
boiler, adding further evidence that few if any supercritical boilers achieved a highlevel of
labor productivity.
Advances in metallur', which have been credited for allowing larger scaleand
higher temperatures and pressures, apparently were unable to keep ahead of theneeds of
plant designers.Wally Ghilani of the Harrison plant cited leaks, overheating, and
"fishmouth stress' in his supercritical boilers, as well as the complexityintroduced by "so
many relays, so much protection" that the problem offalse alarms was "phenomenal.' Paul
Wade of Btill Run also reported gas leaks, which he attributed to 'phasedpressurized
furnaces,' 'a design that we learned just didn't work." Cathcart of HomerCity described
considerable extra maintenance connected with "tears in casing" that wererelated to high
furnace pressure.
Most managers agreed that economies of scale had been exhausted.As shown above
in Table 4, the average capacity of new plants reached a plateau at 850MW by 1972-74 and
increased little after that. Carl Higgs of La Cynge felt that the optimalsize of a single unit
ntcrect"glWestinghouse officials attribute part of their problems to inadequate research and
development espenditures in the 1960s. See "The Turbine Troubles that Plague Westinghouse,"Business Week,
Aprii 6,1984, pp.54-55.
Another case is the Harrison (WV) plant, which is labelled here erroneously as anegative outlier only
because the government data source greatly understated employment in threeof the five years 1983-87 (as
reported above).
1948-58 1958-68 1968-78 1978-87
1958-68 to
1968-87
Exogenous 3.35-0.45-1.90 1.43 0.13
Technical Design 6.36534-2.55-2.26-7.95
Operating 1.10 1.10-0.10-0.10-1.20
Other + Residual Error -1.98-1. 2.67 0.583.12
Equals: Actual Productivity Change 8.834.75-1.88-0.35-5.91
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go.' Cathcart of Homer City claimed that manufacturers had sold larger units in the 1960s
by 'extrapolating the features of smaller units and convincing users that they didn't require
extra maintenance.'
In another comment with important implications for practitioners of the hedonic
regression technique, Cathcart contrasted the features of his two 600 MW supercritical units
(vintage 1969) with his 650 MW subcritical unit (vintage 1977). In putting out bids for the
earlier units, his company had emphasized low cost and had specified only a few basic
specificationstemperature, pressure, etc. In contrast, the bidding procedure for the newer
unit involved much more detailed specifications, chosen to avoid the maintenance problems
encountered in the earlier units. 'Wall thickness on tubes was increased from 150 to 200
mils, the maximum velocity of the gas stream was reduced from 85 to 55,' and so on. A
hedonic regression explaining equipment prices of the type developed in Gordon (1990,
Chapter 5) and Joskow-Rose (1985) would treat all three units as essentially identical and
would overstate the price increase from 1969 to 1977. Continuing the theme of 'learning
by doing,' James Agnew at Cuniberland attributed his ability to reduce plant staffing to a
gradual process of modifying his 1973-vintage 'prototype units' (two enormous units of 1300
MW each). The furnace had been changed, generating surface had been added to boilers,
and precipitator surface had been added.
The later group of interviews did not have quite as gloomy a tone as those conducted
earlier. In fact, there are some signs in the interviews (although not yet in our data) that
Implications of the Coefficients for the ProductWity Growth Slowdown
The sources of the productivity slowdown in the industry can be decomposed for
alternative equations and for alternative sets of years. Lines A and B compare the growth
rates of actual and predicted output per employee over the sample of coal-using plants. The
predicted value is based on actual output and the equation's prediction of employment
based on the estimated coefficients of column (4) in Table 10, multiplied by the mean values
of each independent variable for the year in question.
The seven lines of section C of the table decompose predicted productivity growth
in each decade among the contributions of the independent variables in the equation. Each
contribution is calculated by multiplying the appropriate coefficient times the change in the
independent variable over the previous decade. This is done in straightforward fashion for
the variables listed in lines O through C7, where output is treated as exogenous and every
predicted change in employment creates a change in productivity of the opposite sign. The
calculation of the effects of changing capacity and utilization require an extra step, since
both output and employment are altered. Line la shows the direct effect of higher capacity
on output, and line lb subtracts that effect times the estimated coefficient on capacity in the
employment equation (0.623).Similarly, line 2a shows the direct effect of changing
utilization on output growth, holding constant capacity, while line 2b subtracts the (near-
zero) coefficient on utilization in the employment equation. The interaction effects of
vintage and time with capacity are grouped together on lines lc and id under capacity, and
simibrly the interaction effect of time with utilization is shown on line 2c, while the heat
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1948 to 0.71 in 1968, and then falling to 0.49 in 1987. The effect of increasing scale on
productivity is measured by unity minus this coefficient, and thus is V-shaped.The
implication that the productivity benefits of increased scale were lowest in 1968 seems
consistent with the maintenance problems of large plants built in the late 1960s, as discussed
in section VII below. The third interaction effect indicates a more severe adverse vintage
shift for plants that are energy inefficient.
We may also inquire which characteristics are correlated with an adverse 'time shift,"
i.e., tendency to require more employees with increasing plant age after 1968 as compared
to before 1968. The time shift interactions in column (4) indicate that this age deterioration
effect was greatest for plants that were relatively large, heavily utilized, and energy-
inefficent. The utilization interaction can be described in a second way: the employee
requirements imposed by an above-average utilization rate increased after 1968, possibly
because environmental regulations raised the employee requirements of maintenance for
high-utilization plants. Stated a third and perhaps more appealing way, the employee savings
made possible by a low utilization rate were greater after 1968, perhaps because plant
managers interpreted the low utilization rates as permanent rather than temporary as in the
1950s and reduced their work forces accordingly. It is important to note that the interaction
terms in column (4) cause the time shift variable to lose statistical significance.
25. The implied vintage and vintage shift coedents for 200 MW plants are -0.032 and+0.069,and for 2000
MW plants arc -0.012 and+0.019.
the worst may be over. Several managers cited enthusiastically the role of computerized
controls, which can analyze and predict maintenance problems before they occur. Don
Wilson at Mohave raved above his training simulator, which could train operators how to
handle every eventuality without endangering either of his two large 790 MW units. Tony
Leavitte of Gardner cited improved control systems and water treatment equipment as
allowing him to reduce his staff by about three percent over the most rent two years. He
was also enthusiastic about his CRT-equipped control room which allowed operators to plot
the "trend" of numerous variables like temperature and pressure and spot potential problems
in advance.
How do plant managers of negative outlier plants explain their low level of
employment? Consistent with my earlier research on airlines (1965), managers with poor
productivity performance blame outside forces, while managers with a high level of
productivity attribute their performance to themselves and their workers. James Stape of
the-San Tan (AZ) plant (neg. 90) stated flatly that 'we're good' and that his employees were
a 'close-knit" group, the 'opposite of Navajo," a plant owned by the same firm that is at the
top of our positive outlier list. Rick Smith of the Fort Phantom (TX) plant (neg. 90) cited
'the quality of our guys.' Tim Lavette attributed the performance of his Danskhanimer
plant to a "company philosophy to be lean up and down.'
Overall, the interviews add up to a convincing case in support of the 'depletion
hypothesis." Advances in productivity in the first two decades of the postwar era (and
before 1948 as well) were made possible by technical improvements that allowed for higher
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1960s. The technical barrier represented by supercritical pressure may be likened to the
barrier of supersonic speed in the aircraft industry. Coincidentally, the postwar upsurge in
aircraft scale and speed also seems to have come to an end around 1970 (Gordon, 1990,
Chapter 4). One ray of hope is that, having deteriorated so much from the optimism of
1965 to the gloom of 1982 the conditions for productivity growth do not seem to have
deteriorated further during the rest of the 1980s. Plant managers viewed themselves as
operating in a difficult environment, but with few exceptions felt that the environment had
remained stable over the past five years.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to decompose the sources of the slowdown in labor productivity
growth in the steam-electric generating industry among a number of possible causes.
Particular emphasis is placed on the separate roles of economies of scale, embodied
technical change, and disembodied technical change. The major conclusions can be divided
among methodology and substance.
Methodology
1. Data sets that provide information on individual plants observed along the two
dimensions of vintage and age are particularly useful in studying the sources of growth.
Cross-section data also allow for quantification of scale effects, shifts in the locational mix,
and other sources of productivity change that are lumped together as an unexplained
rate, utilization rate, and vintage, that may partially explain some of the behavior of
individual coefficients in Tables 6 and 7.In Table 9 heat rates and utilization rates are
displayed for new plants built at selected vintage intervals and for three fuel types. For
coal-using and oil-only plants, the relationship between vintage and heat rate traces out a
backward "J." This reversal still leaves the heat rate in 1983-86 lower (better) than in 1948-
52 in contrast to the implication of the vintage trend for coal plants in Table 5 (which
shows that the reversal more than cancelled the 1948-68 improvement). We can reconcile
this conflict when we recognize the role of the capacity effect in the regressions, which
explains part of the 1948-68 improvement in heat rate by increased scale rather than by the
vintage trend.
Exploration of every possible interaction effect for each of the three equations in
Table 6 is infeasible. Instead, the basic equation for coal-using plants with average vintages
(column 2 in Table 7) is presented in Table 10 with the addition of various interaction
effects. The previous discussion suggests that there may be important interaction effects
between vintage and vintage-shift, on the one hand, and capacity, utilization, and heat rate,
on the other hand. All six of these possible interaction effects are included in column (2)
of Table 10, and three are statistically significantthe log of capacity times the vintage
variable and vintage shift variables, and the heat rate residual times the vintage shift
variable. Column (3) estimates the same equation withonlythe five significant interaction
variables included from column (2). The first two interaction terms (lines Sc and Sd)
indicate that the 'V-shaped" pattern of the vintage shift is steeper for small than for large
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of new units before 1948. There are several interesting changes in the coefficients in Table
7 as compared with Table 6.The utilization coefficient for noncoal plants becomes
insignificant, as does the heat rate residual coefficient for coal plants. The "V" of the
vintage trends becomes steeper for both fuel types, while the "V" of the time trends becomes
flatter for both fuel types.
3. Sample Spüt. All employment equations thus far force the coefficients other than
the vintage and time trends to be identical over the entire 1948-87 sample period. Table
8 examines the validity of this constraint by estimating separate equations for 1948-67 and
1968-87, while retaining the measure of average vintage introduced in the preceding section.
There are numerous changes in coefficients, indicating a change in structure over the two
halves of the postwar period. The capacity coefficients rise in the second half for both fuel
types. The utilization coefficient for coal now has the wrong sign in the first half and is
insignificant for noncoal in both halves. The heat rate residual coefficient is significant only
in the first half for both fuel types, indicating perhaps more heterogeneity in design in the
pre-1968 period.However, there is no important change in the vintage or time trend
coefficients. Bothimplythe usual "V-shaped" pattern for both the vintage and time effects.
The F(14,3004) ratio of 135 for coal and the F(14,1960) ratio of 5.1 for noncoal indicate
that the equations for the two halves of the postwar period cannot be pooled.
4. interaction Effects. The shift in structure over time suggested in Table 8 can be
paraineterized in a single equation by allowing for interaction effects among fuel type, heat
"residual" in aggregate studies.
In microeconomic research on data sets that identify individual observations, e.g.,
plants or firms, a study of a mysterious phenomenon like the productivity slowdown can
benefit from direct personal or telephone contact with plant or firm representatives.Such
contact can reveal errors in data or interpretation at previous stages of aparticular research
study, and can add detail to flesh Out an abstract academic conjecture, e.g., the"depletion
hypothesis."
Data sets that identify establishments and firms separately allow for a detailed
analysis of "within" establishment and "between" establishment and firm effects. This is an
unambiguous advantage of establishment data over the firm data used in many studies, and
isonlypartly offset by measurement errors when separate plants within a firm share
employees.
Substantwe Results
The steam-electric utility industry experienced a much sharper slowdown in the
growth of labor productivity after 1968 than the U. S. economy as a whole. Thestudy
identifies four main sources of the growth slowdown, each of which appears tohave
operated with more severity than in the whole economy.
1. A sharp drop in plant utilization occurred after the late 1960s,resulting both from
the two oil shocks that raised the relative price of electricity, andfrom the slowdown in
output and productivity growth in the rest of the economy. Bothof these factors caused the
growth rate of electricity demand to slacken sharply in the mid-1970simmediately after
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that 92 to 98 percent of any change in utilization flows through to a change in labor
productivity in the same direction.
The growth of average plant size and unit size decelerated sharply after the late
1960s. Before 1968 rapid increases in the scale of new plants, together with a relatively
smdl elasticity of employment growth to scale growth, allowed for productivity improve.
ments. Earlier increases in scale resulted from incremental improvements in technology,
particularly in metallurgy.After 1968, however, capacity growth appears to have
encountered technical constraints. The impact of this source of the productivity slowdown
is consistent with the "depletion hypothesis" of the overall economy-wide slowdown.
There was a disappearance in productivity gains associated with newer plants of
a given capacity, i.e., the "vintage shift' effect.Plant designers appear to have run into
unanticipated technical barriers that caused them to build plants that were too large, too
complex, and which required a high and unanticipated level of maintenance expenditures.
Beyond the contribution of equipment manufacturing problems to the productivity
slowdown, after 1968 the utility industxy encountered problems in operating pre-existing
equipment.Less than one-third of this 'time specific' effect can be attributed to
environmental legislation.An undetermined part of the rest is due to a previously
unanticipated maintenance backlog on plants of earlier generations built when technology
arrived at the apparent frontier in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The regressions in this paper attempt to explain the relation of employment to output
frame displays the percentage deviation of each vintage coefficient from the 1967.69
coefficient, and the bottom frame shows the same percentage deviation for the time
coefficients. The time coefficients in the bottom frame display the same 'V-shaped" pattern
as the more parsimonious specification in Table 6, and repeat our previous finding that the
"V" has a steeper slope for coal than for noncoal plants. Also, we can see here that the
pattern for the noncoal plants is better described as a "U" than a 'V", with a long flat
portion between 1965 and 1980.
However, the vintage coefficients in the top frame of Figure 1 do not trace out a
simple 'V-shaped' pattern and indicate that the parsimonious specification of Table 6 is
oversimplified. The F(24,4140) ratio of 3.29 for coal plants and F(22,2450) ratio of 8.64 for
noncoal plants indicates that the employment equation with separate coefficients for the
year-triplets fits significantly better than the specification in Table 6 that imposes two linear
trends centered on 1968. However, since the other coefficients in the equations appear to
be almost identical whether the Table 6 or year-triplet specification is used, we will explore
the other variants in this section with the Table 6 specification.
2. Average Vintage. The next variant is to move to a more accurate measure of
plant vintage. The results in Table 6 are based on the vintage listed in the original data
source, which is the date when the plant was first constructed. However, this does not take
account of the fact that many plants install additional units at a later date. A more accurate
vintage measure takes the average vintage of all units in the plant installed as of a given
year of observation. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires throwing away all
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true deterioration of productivity.
The fiiuil set of coefficients refers to dummy variables for fuel use. Coal use (either
by itself or together with other fuels) raises employment requirements by 19 percent
compared to oil-only and 21 percent compared to gas-only plants?'
The other col,imnc in Table 6 exhibit the results for the subsample of coal-using and
noncoal-using plants. The major differences are that the utilization effect is smaller for both
fuel groups when the sample is disaggregated; the heat rate effect is much higher for
noncoal plants, while the post-1968 deterioration in productivity measured by the vintage
trend shift applies only to coal plants, since noncoal plants show an acceleration in
productivity improvement over successive vintages. The V-shaped time trend coefficients
apply to both fuel groups, but the slope of the "V" is steeper for coal plants. The F(18,6636)
ratio of 71.9, compared to a one percent critical value of 1.87, provides strong evidence that
the observations for the coal and non-coal plants are not generated from the same
relationship.
Variations on the Basic Employment Equations
1. Year Triplets. The first variant is to replace the simple trend and trend shift
terms with separate vintage and time coefficients for successive intervals of three years each
('rear triplets"), 1949-51, 1952-54, etc. The results are plotted in Figure 1, where the top
24. This compares closely with the average of 22 percent for the coal use dummy across the seven cells in
Busbe's study (1981, p. 192).The linear specification of Wills' employment equation precludes direct
comparisons with his coefficients.
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by holding constant numerous characteristi of individual plants. If the on(y cause of the
slowdown in labor productivity growth in the electric utility industry had been a deceleration
in the rate of technical change embodied in new equipment, this would be imply that there
had been no slowdown in the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP), since all of the
declining growth rate of output per hour would be explained by an equal-sized decline in
the growth rate of capital's contribution to output. Another implication of this hypothetical
finding would be that the source of the productivity problem originates not in the electric
utility industry but in the electric equipment industry within the manufacturing sector.
However, a substantial fraction of the overall slowdown in labor productivity in
electricity generation can be linked to factors other than embodied technical change, and
thus did occur within the utility industry itself. In contrast to labor productivity growth for
our sample of plants, which exhibited a deceleration from 7.5 percent per annum in 1948-68
to -0.4 percent per year in 1968-87 (for a total slowdown of 7.9 points), TFP growth using
official NIPA deflators for the capital stock slowed from 3.6 to -1.8 percent per year (for a
total slowdown of 5.4 points). When the deflator of electric generating equipment is
measured by a hedonic index of the type developed by Gordon (1990) and Joskow-Rose
(1985), TFP slows from 1.8 to -2.7 points, for a slowdown of 4.5 points?7 Not coincidental-
ly, the slowdown of 4.5 points is very close to the time shift coefficients in our all-fuel
equations in Tables 6 and 7, ranging from 3.6 to 4.7 points. The fact that TFP slows less
37. This calculation is not shown in the paper to save space. Output, employment, and nominal equipment
cost refer to our sample of plants. The hedonic equipment deflator comes from Gordon (1990), Table 5.9, coL
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than average labor productivity, and that TFP growth in the pre.1968 period was so much
slower than the growth of average labor productivity, underlines the responsibility of capital
input growth for much of the industry's outstanding achievements ¡n the first half of the
postwar period and for its abysmal performance since then.
This paper represents only a beginning in studying the industry's productivity
problems. Much of the large "time shift" effect remains unexplained. A more complete
investigation would incorporate into the data more information on the design characteristics
of individual plants, although our interview study suggests that many explanatory factors will
inevitably be overlooked. A wider interview survey might reveal a more specific estimate
of the impact of air and water pollution control legislation.Comparisons with foreign
countries, using a combination of econometrics and interviews, might reveal the relative
roles of design philosophy, equipment reliability, operating procedures, and environmental
regulation in explaining why the European and Japanese electric power industries have not
exhibited deteriorating performance to the same extent as the American industry.
Finally, one might hope that the mixture of econometric and interview techniques utilized
here could be fruitfully employed in other industries, and that economists interested in
production economics might devote more attention to the possibility of interviewing the
business executives whose behavior they are trying to explain.
38. The more cautious design philosophy of European manufacturers during the postwar years is discussed
by Hirsch (1989), pp. 3, 75.
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of a given vintage and capacity.A plant having a relatively large number of small units
requires, understandably, more labor than another plant having the same capacity but a
relatively small number of larger units.
In lines 5 and 6 we find that the labor productivity slowdown has occurred across
both vintage and date of observation. The vintage trend coefficient is -0.015 for all years,
whereas the vintage shift variable has a coefficient of + 0.032 indicating a net deterioration
of productivity growth during 1968-87 at a rate of 1.7 percentage points per year on
successive newer vintages. The productivity of older plants deteriorated as well after 1968.
The coefficient for the trend on date of observation is -0.027, and that of the 1968-87 shift
variable is 0.047, indicating that after 1968 the productivity of existing plants of all vintages
deteriorated at a rate of 2.0 percentage points per year.Overall, successive vintages
improved in productivity by 30 percent between 1948 and 1967, after which productivity
declined by 32 percent between 1967 and 1987. Plants of all vintages observed in 1967 had
a productivity performance 54 percent better than plants observed in 1948, but afterward
there was a decline in productivity amounting to 38 percent by 1987. These estimates hold
constant the influence of capacity and utilization; hence in the early years these trends
understate the true effect of increasing vintage in contributing to productivity growth, since
increased capacity over successive vintages raised productivity until 1968, while after 1968
size levelled off but utilization fell, thus causing the time trend coefficients to understate the
. The estimation of the heat rate residual implies that it is independent of the other explanatory variables
in the equation, and hence it La not surprising that there is virtually no change in the other coefficients in the
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the time trend and trend shift coefficients to drop by roughly half. Thus,with the relative
price omitted, about half of the pre-1968 improvement in fuel use for plants of a given
vintage, and about half of the post-1968 deterioration, is offset by the effect of a failing
relative price in sthnulating fuel use before the late 1960s and in encouraging fuel
conservation after the early 1970s.
The Basic Employment Equation
The first column of Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the basic
employment specification (equation 2 above) for the edited sample of 6674 observations.2'
The elasticity óf employment to capacity changes is 034, confirming the substantial
economies to scale found in previous studies.n The elasticity of employment to utilization
is 0.12, indicating that labor requirements fluctuate only modestly in response to demand
changes, and thus that labor productivity is highly sensitive to changes in utili,ntion. Taken
by itself this coefficient suggests that labor productivity should have declined in the 1970s
in response to decreasing average utilization (shown in Table 4).
The coefficient on the heat rate residual is positive, suggesting that plants having
relatively high energy requirements also have relatively high labor requirements.This
coefficient can be interpreted as a proxy for unmeasured design differences among plants
There are fewer observations here than in Table 5, because there are some observations which are
mksndata on empioyment but not the heat rate.
Joskow and Schmalensec (1983, pp. 48-54) provide a relatively recent survey.
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given output with several small units use more fuel than plants with fewer and larger
units.19
Both the vintage trend and time trend coefficients have a V-shaped pattern, with a
negative overall trend more than offset by a positive post-1968 trend. The trends imply for
all plants in column (1), for instance, that a 1948-vintage plant of given size used 2 percent
more fuel per unit of output than a 1968 plant, and that a 1987-vintage plant used 93
percent more fuel. All of the deterioration after 1968 can be attributed to coal plants, since
the two vintage terms for noncoal-using plants are of equal and opposite sign, implying flat
fuel use after 1968. The time trend coefficients imply the same V-shaped pattern for plants
of a given vintage observed in successive years and are consistent, for instance, with the
effect of environmental regulations in causing a shift from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal and
oil requiring more BTrJs to generate a unit of output.2° The results indicate that the
experience of coal and noncoal plants differs; the F(19,6819) ratio of 29.1 far exceeds the
one percent critical value of 1.87, indicating that the data for the two fuel types cannot be
pooled as in column (1).
An interesting interaction among the coefficients becomes evident when the
equations in Table 5 are reestiniated with the relative price variable omitted. This causes
Building fewer and larger units per plant economizes on capital cost and labor as well as fuel. See
HIrsch (1989, p.43), who also notes that prior to the 1930s as many as eight boilers were neceasasy per turbine-
generator, but that by the 1930s firms had learned how to economize with "unit-type" construction, that is, one
boiler per generator.
Gollop and Roberts (1985) provide data on the cost of pollution control equipment and required
reductions in emissions, but not on the fuel-using effect of shifting to low-sulfur fueL
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the utilization rate for new plants was higher than for all plants prior to 1968, while the
reverse was true beginning in 1969-71.
V. ESTIMATED FUEL AND LABOR INPUT EQUATIONS
The Fuel Input Equations
The estimated coefficients for the fuel input equation (5) are presented in Table 5,
where the three columns report results for all plants in the edited sample, and for the subset
of coal-using and noncoal-using plants.18 The significance of coefficients is indicated by
asterisks, and evezy coefficient in the table is significant at the one percent level, with three
exceptions.
The negative coefficient on capacity implies that the well-documented economies of
scale in equipment cost and labor use extend to fuel use as well. The negative coefficient
on utilization could indicate both that plants which experience a lot ofdowntime are also
inefficient users of fuel, and that fuel is wasted when plants are shut down for maintenance
and then started up again. The relative price term has the expected negative sign and is
much larger for coal than noncoal plants. As would be expected, plants which generate a
18. The vintage and time trend shifts are dethed in exactly the same way. The vintage trend is ntered
on 1968, that is, equals -20 in 1948,0 in 1968, and +19 in 1987. The vintage trendshift variable equals zero in
allycars through 1968, and thenequalsthetrend runningfroin +1m 196910 +19 in1987. The'base" for the
fuel-use dummy variable refers to plants which use both oil and gas.
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observed in each successive year starting with the first year after its commencement of
operations, the sample is quite large, consisting of 7701 observations prior to editing.
Editing pruned the sample down to 6656 observations, as described in the Appendix.
Several features of the data need to be considered when interpreting the econometric
results below. The greatest problems are posed by the presence of technically heteroge-
neous units in some multi-unit plants, and by varying technical specifications in new plants
of a given vintage. Spurious errors caused by the first of these can be minimized either by
editing the sample or by including dummy variables. The second cannot be escaped but
should cause no bias in coefficients if the distribution of technical features across plants of
a given vintage tends to remain constant over successive vintages. A final data problem
involves possible measurement errors in the data on plant employees.16
Table 4 exhibits for selected intervals, separately for new plants and all plants, the
annual average number of plants, and their average capacity (C), utilization rate (Q/C), and
output per employee (Q/L). The new plants have a smaller capacity than the average for
all plants in several of the early intervals. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by
a greater number of small-sized units in existing plants (average units per plant decreased
steadily from 11.0 in pre-1948 plants to 1.5 in plants of the 1986 vintage).'7 Productivity
in new plants actually declined by two-thirds between 1966-68 and 1986-87, while productivity
Bushe complains that the labor data are imprecise....misleading'S and cites instances of firms that
allocate all maintenance labor to one plant. We return to this issue in discussing our interviews with managers
of outlier plants.
There were no new plants built in 19V, a fact confirmed by Hirsch (1989), p. 165.involving energy use. Instead, we view the coefficient on the heat rate in ouremployment
regressions as a proxy for unmeasured design characteristics of plants of a givencapacity and
vintage. Our treatment of the heat rate variable as an indicator of plantefficiency is
consistent with the approach of Schxnalensee and Joskow (1985, p. 1), whoexplicitly list heat
rate as one of two "indices of quality,' the other being the plant'savailability factor.
To embody the idea that the heat rate effect represents unmeasureddesign
characteristics, in the present paper the employment equations include not the heat rate
itself but rather the residual from the fuel input equation, CHwhich is specified:
InHR =+ a1lnC +u2ln(-) + 3lfl(_!)
lo
+ a4N + a5 V + a6T+ E13D, +
t-1
The specification of the fuel input equation is identical to that of the labor input equation
(2), except that the heat rate term in (2) is replaced by the relative price of fuel (PI/PL).
After (5) is estimated, the residual for each observation is included as an explanatory
variable in (2).
Data and Estimation Issues
The data file includes all plants listed in the publication Steam-Electric Power
Construction Cost and Annua! Production Expenses for the period 1948-87. Intotal 401
individual plants are represented, of which 68 were constructed prior to 1948, 113during




All data were obtiined from the annual publication of the U. S. Energy Information
Mmnistration. In 1978 the title of the publication changed from 'Steam-Electric Plant
Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses' to "Thermal-Electric Plant and
Construction Cost and Annual Expenses," and then in 1982 to "Historical Plant Cost and
Annual Production Expenses for Selected Electric Plants." In prior years the publication
was issued by predecessor agencies, particularly the Federal Power Commission.
The data file contains plants observed from 1948 to 1987, but vintages of these plants
extend back to the early years of the century. Data for years through 1971 were obtained
from Thomas Cowing, and data for years since 1972 were added by successive research
assistants. Most plants added to the original data set had vintage of 1972 or newer, with six
exceptions. Some changes in plant identification also occurred as a result of merging of
units previously considered as separate plants.The complete data set contains 7701
observations, with 29 basic variables per observation (including dummies for fuel type,
construction type, and regional location), and a number of additional constructed variables.
The 1982 change in the title of the data source also involved a downsizing of the data
from a nearly complete census to a sample. Plants excluded in 1982 and subsequent years
amounted to 25 percent of the plants in the 1981 population, but only 9 percent of the total
output of the 1981 population, since the excluded plants were on average only one-third as
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Editing and Adjustments
The total sample of 7701 was edited down to the 6674 observations used in the initial
regression reported in the first column of Table 5. Several criteria were used in editing and
apply to the entire data set, not just the new post-1971 observations added for this project.
Cleaning. Observations were excluded when (a) the utilization rate was
below 5 percent, (b) when data seemed to be of the wrong order of magnitude, (c) when
plant statistics were reported jointly with a nuclear or gas turbine plant, or (d) when data
were missing for specific variables needed for a regression. Particular care was taken to
make sure that the location, plant construction, and vintage dummies were identical from
year to year for each plant, and that there were no implausible jumps in data on capacity
and the number of units. In years when plant capacity was missing, this could sometimes
be calculated from data on output and the utilization rate.
Adjustments. There were six cases when two or three plants shared a
single listed employment figure, and in these cases all variables were aggregated over the
plants in question to form a single observation for the hybrid plant. In some recent years
data are reported as applying to a percentage 'P' of the plant, and quantity data are then
divided by T'. Comparisons with adjacent years are made to determine whether "P" applies
to all variables, especially employment data. Where some units were indoors and some
outdoor, the construction plant dummy was coded 'semi-outdoor.'
Configuration Changes. Plants were included only in the first full year of
operation are included for each plant but no vintage variable is introduced.'5
The larger number of dummy variables included in (2) reflects the much larger
sample size in our study. Our sample consists of 6674 observations after editing, in contrast
to 163 for Wills and cell sample sizes ranging from 25 to 162 for Bushe. Our larger sample
size stems both from the inclusion of each plant for every year of operation (starting from
the first complete year), and also the addition of 18 extra years of data beyond that available
to Bushe and Wills.
Because our point of departure is the productivity slowdown, the estimates below of
(2) allow the vintage (a5) and time (a6) coefficients to shift after 1968. We attempt to
identify the sources of these shifts by allowing for interaction effects and by isolating
observations that are consistent 'outliers.' Another difference among the specifications is
apparent in Wills' omission of an output or utilization variable, in contrast to its inclusion
in equations (2) and (4).
The Fuel Input Equation and the 'Heat Rate Residual"
The conventional economic theory of production based on homogeneous and highly
substitutable inputs might lead to the expectation of a negative coefficient on the heat rate
(energy use divided by output) stemming from substitution between energy and labor. In
contrast our basic approach holds that there are few ex post substitution opportunities
15. Busbe edits bis sample to include observations beginning in the second full year of operation and
extending until the end of the sample or two years prior to installation of a new unit. We begin in the first full
year of operation and apply a different editing criterion described in the Appendix.
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and of Busbe (1981, p. 194):
InL=
The additional symbol in the Wills equation iswhich stands for a set of eight overlapping
dummy variables for year of observation, in contrast to the linear time trend (7') imposed
in (2).14 The Bushe equation omits vintage effects and instead uses design data to divide
up the total sample into seven technically homogeneous cells, and the coefficients in
equation (4) are separately for each cell. The log-linear functional form of our specification
(2) is shared with (4). In contrast, in (3) Wills begins with a linear form but allows for
interaction effects and normalizes by capacity. Bushe also implicitly normalizes by capacity,
since the average capacity within his seven separate cells differs by several orders of
magnitude.
A basic difference between the three specifications is the allowance for both time and
vintage effects in (2), only vintage effects in (3) and only "cell' effects in (4). The vintage
variable is included in (2) but not in (3), because the latter includes observations only for
newly installed plants, whereas the former includes observations for each year of operation.
The Bushe approach in (4) appears to be inconsistent, in that data for multiple years of
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operation, that is, the year after the vintage year, and were also excluded for years t-1 and
t whenever there was a change in year t in either the number of units or anon-negligible
change in capacity. This exclusion principle applies both to increases and decreases in units
and/or capacity.
4.Average Vintage. Most of the regression results refer to the "average"
vintage of a plant. This is simply the average of the vintage for each unit in the plant. A
plant installed in 1955 with 5 units that adds an additional unit in 1966 would be coded as
vintage 1956.8, rounded to 1957.
14. The two dummy variables in the Wills equation are for presence of coal burning and of more than one







Percentage Deviation of Vintage and Time Trend
Coefficients from 1968 Level,
Employment Regression, Coal and Noncoal Plants
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requirements and fuel use are taken to be endogenous choice variables, and equipment
characteristics and output are the exogenous explanatory variables. Plant capacity, fuel type,
and location are assumed to be predetermined by previous investment decisions, and output
(or utilization), is assumed to be set by an exogenously determined demand for electricity
at preset prices.
Because causation goes from output to inputs, and because there are two input
equations, it is inappropriate to take the estimated coefficients from a single input equation,
e.g., labor, and attempt to invert them to retrieve the underlying production function. We
begin with the employment equation, relate it to previous research, and then subsequently
adopt a parallel specification for the fuel input equation. The basic employment regression
is estimated below for plant data in the following form:
mLa0 + 1InC + azin(.) + a3 In e
(2)
+ a4N + a5 V + a6 r + E f3,D1 +
¡.1
where L is employment, C is capacity, Q is output, a1is the "heat rate residual" discussed
below, N is the number of units, Vis vintage, T is the year of each observation, the D are
ten dummy variables for type of fuel, type of construction, and location, andCLis the error
term. It is useful to compare (2) with other specifications of the employment equation, e.g.,
those of Wills (1978, p. 508):Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 14
explaining the usage of labor and fuel inputs for the installed stock of equipment.11 Such
a study seems justified in view of the passage of time since the lastround of studies by
Cowing (1970, 1974), Wills (1978), and Bushe (1981))2Another justification is that new
questions have been raised by the productivity slowdown and by environmental regulation.
Finally, most of the more recent studies have been based on firm rather than the
establishment data used here and have been more concerned with measuring economies of
scale than interpreting the productivity slowdow&
IV. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATA
The Employment Equation
This section of the paper specifies a regression equation in which plant employment
is explained by output and by various embodied characteristics of installed BTG units. This
corresponds to the "ex post" or "operating" decision that, according to the consensus of
previous research, is constrained by previous "ex ante" or "investment" decisions. Labor
Sec especially Joskow.Rose (1985) and Gordon (1990), which estimate equipment price indexes that
decrease rapidly relative to the corresponding NIPA indexes through the late 1960s and rise much faster
thereafter.
The earlier studies are surveyed by Cowing and Smith (1978).
Among these studies are Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), Gollop and Roberts (1981, 1983), Cowing.
Small and Stevenson (1981), and Christensen and Greene (1976). The advantages of plant over &m data are
discussed by Cowing and Smith (1978), pp. 175.7, with reference to the papers by Nerlove (1963) and
Christensen-Greene (1976). A dissenting opinion is offered by Gollop-Roberts (1981, p. 120), who argue that
"producers make input decisions on the basis of technical and market conditions facing the complete system, not
isolated plants.' However, when plant data are available, there is no reason to make this choie ex ante, as
aggregation issues can be studied explicitly by estimating firm and establishment effects, as in Table 12 below.
Sources by column:
TABLE i
Output Per Hour Nonfarm Business and Electric Utilities,
and Real Price of Electricity, Various Intervals,
1899. 1988
1899-1948, Kendrick (1961), Table A.XX, pp. 338-40, linked in 1948 to
Economic Report of the President, 1990, Table C-46.
1899.1953, ICendsick (1961), Table H-VI, pp. 590.91, linked in 1953 to
NIPA Table 6.2, line 49 (electric, gas, and sanitary services), linked in 1958
to BLS for electric utilities (1958-63 from BLS Bulletin 2296, February 1988,
Table 261, p. 142 and 1963-88 from BLS Bulletin 2349, February 1990, Table
279, p. 150).
1899-1970, Hirsch (1989), Figure 7, p. 9, linked to NIPA, Table 7.10, line









1899 - 1923 2.1 5.7 -7.4
1923. 1948 2.1 6.1 -6.7
1948- 1963 2.6 6.8 .1.3
1963. 1973 2.2 5.5 -0.8
1973- 1988 1.0 1.2 1.6TABLE 2
Selected Figures on Industry Output,
Productivity and Prices,
Levels and Growth Rates, Selected Intervals, 1948-88
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Technological Histoiy and Its Impilcations for Econometric Research
Previous research on the production process for electricity generation (Cowing-Smith,
1978; Wills, 1978) reached a consensus that the usual economic approach to production,
based on the notion of homogeneous, divisible, and highly substitutable factor inputs, does
not apply for this industry.Instead, the dominant feature of the production process is
heterogeneous capital that incorporates the most efficient technology available at the date
of its construction but, once built, embodies fixed technical characteristics that impose very
tight constraints on the feasible set of input-output combinations. The firm's choices are
decomposed between flex ante" investment decisions and "ex post" operating decisions, the
latter involving the choice of variable inputs needed to produce desired output with exIsting
equipment.
This two-stage view of the production process leads Barzel (1964), Wifis (1978), and
others to a two-step econometric procedure. The available opportunities that constrain the
firm's investment decision are characterized in a hedonic price function that relates the price
of equipment to its attributes. Then the operating decision is described in a regression of
fuel, employment, or both, on the main attributes of each installed set of equipment. Wills
concludes, in common with other studies dating back to Komiya (1962), that 'substitution
opportunities at the plant level between equipment, fuel, and labor are poor."
In light of the availability of recent research on the first-step hedonic regression for

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ALevels
1948 16.3 1.03 15.8 0.98
1953 26.5 1.11 23.8 0.93
1958 36.5 1.16 31.4 34.7 0.85
1963 49.9 1.17 42.7 51.0 0.80
1968 68.1 1.26 54.1 70.1 0.72
1973 92.6 1.41 65.7 88.4 0.74
1978 97.8 1.48 66.1 96.8 0.87
1983 104.3 1.67 62.5 90.9 0.99
1988 134.3 1.75 76.7 105.6 0.94
B. An,uwj RatesofGrowth
1948-53 9.7 1.5 8.2 .1.0
1953-58 6.4 0.9 5.5 -1.8
1958-63 6.3 0.2 6.1 7.7 -1.2
1963-68 6.2 1.5 4.7 6.4 -2.1
1968-73 6.1 2.2 3.9 4.6 0.5
1973-78 1.1 1.0 0.1 1.8 3.2
1978-83 1.3 2.4 -1.1 .1.3 2.6
1983-88 5.1 0.9 4.1 3.0 .1.0
Sources by column:(1)-(3) and (5) from NIPA as follows, (1): 1948-73, Table 6.2, line 49, linked in 1977
to Survey of Current Business, January 1991, Table 6, line 49, p. 34; (2): Table 6.11,
line 1.5; (3)(1)/(2); (5) Table 7.10, line 50.
(4) uses the same sources as Table 1, col. (2).Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 12
turbines, twisted and cracked turbine blades, and ash buildup in furnaces. Because of large
costs in downtime, added maintenance, and retrofittingof units with flawed designs, the
initial cost of equipment appears significantly to understate the 'true' cost of equipment
delivered in the 1960s. In more recent years manufacturers have learned from their design
failures in 1960s-vintage equipment how to avoid design flaws and improve reliability, and
failure rates for 1980s vintage equipment have declined radically.1°
A timing argument exempts environmental regulation from any appreciable blame
in this technological history.Unanticipated problems developed in a major way with
equipment manufactured in the early 1960s, yet the response of utilities to environmental
regulation is usually dated from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (Goilop-Roberts,
1983, p. 654). Yet as the 1970s evolved, environmental regulation played a growing role in
the slowdown in labor productivity growth and decline in thermal efficiency experienced by
utilities, as regulations induced a shift away from soft coal, required major capital
expenditures for scrubbers and other devices, and substantially raised the requirement for
maintenance employees. Thus productivity growth was impeded after the early 1970s by
both the technological plateau and by environmental regulation, introducing a serious
identification problem for any study attempting to explain the productivity growth slowdown.
10. The 'forced-outage' rate after the first year of service for Westinghouse equipment droppedfrom 9
percent for equipment shipped in 1965.69 to 2 percent in 1975-80 to 0.5 percent in 1980-84.
TABLE 3
Output Per Employee,








1948- 1950 1957 - 1959 6.7 - 7.8
1957 - 1959 1966 - 1968 5.3 7.0 7.3
1966- 1968 1972. 1974 3.9 4.8 2.8
1972 - 1974 1978 - 1980 -0.4 1.6 -1.7
1978 - 1980 1985 - 1987 0.5 0.1 0.4
Sources by column:(1) Output, same sources as Table 2, coI. (1); employees from NIPA Table 61GB.
Same as Table 2, col. (4).
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than for units in the 100 MW range.7 Part of this was directly a function of size, since the
time required for units to cool down and heat up is directly related to the mass of the unit,
and part related to the greater complexity of the larger units.Further, metallurgical
problems cropped up in the huge turbine blades on large units, related to the laws of physics
that dictated huge centrifugal forces, as much as 33 tons of force on a 7-pound blade.
The last component of the new technological era involved not just hitting a
technological wail but rather amounted to a full-fledged retreat. Design-by-extrapolation
led to the development in the late 1950s and early 1960s of thesupercritical" boiler
(achieving a pressure above 3200 p.s.i.). However, after reaching a 63 percent share in new
installations during 1970-74, the share fell to 6 percent in 198 1-82 (Joskow-Rose, 1985, Table
1, p. 4). The backing off from supercritical technology resulted mainly from unanticipated
maintenance problems, documented in the interviews at the end of this paper.8
The arrival of a technological frontier interacted with the pitfalls of the design-by-
extrapolation approach, which downgraded the importance of waiting for experience to
accumulate with new larger units.9 Yet as time went on many problems developed that
could have been alleviated with a more cautious approach, e.g., stability problems with
Joskow-Rose (1985, p. 23) report that average equipment availability over the 1969-80 period ranged from
82.8 percent for units of 100 MW to only 62.6 percent for units of 900 MW.
The interviewa contained in an early draft of this paper are cited as an explanation of the abandonment
of supercritical units by HIrsch (1989, pp. 97-9) and Joskow-Rosc (1985, p.23). Note that the Joskow-Roac
evidence suggests that the availability penalty of supercritical units of given size is less than the penalty of
increasing the size of subcritical units from 500 to 900 MW.
9. HIrsch (pp. in-5) provides specific citations of overoptimistic predictions made in the 1950s and 19605
of continued steady advances in temperature, pressure, and size.
NewAll New All NewAll NewAll
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1948-50 11 70 8.20 6.03 85 139 64 62
195 1-53 10 105 11.01 8.13 121 168 67 64
1954-56 9 137 20.3910.63 259219 59 59
1957-59 8 157 22.53 12.18 221254 65 54
1960-62 5 174 29.68 14.63 325324 62 51
1963-65 8 188 29.5018.95 347381 61 53
1966-68 6 203 39.152334 651462 59 57
1969-71 6216 33.9026.00 578561 48 57
1972-74 8.240 30.8727.78 862681 44 53
1975-77 11260 30.4027.16 749769 42 47
1978-80 8270 18.8225.09 818834 42 47
1981-83 5228 20.3326.06 7941009 46 47
1984-85 4 197 18.4625.71 9461174 46 47
1986-87 2194 12.7725.56 9211195 35 47Productivity in Electricity Generation, Page 10 TABLE 5
Equations Explaining The Log of Heat Rate
by Plant, 1948-87
occurred with the previous step.5 Much of the pressure for this new approach came from
the demand for new equipment by utility management who were struggling to keep up with
the demand created by a falling real price of electricity and by their own advertising
designed to stimulate the use of electricity.
The first technological barrier to be reached was an effective upper limit to thermal
efficiency, which had a natural theoretical limit of about 48 percent. Although a few best-
practice plants reached 40 percent, the steeply rising marginal cost of improving efficiency
through the use of exotic and expensive steels prevented further progress.Further,
experience revealed that the 100° increase in temperature from the typical unit of the 1950s
to the 1960s increased corrosive activity fiftyfold, led to the discovexy that "we suddenly are
susceptible to new diseases like stress corrosion cracldng."6 Increased corrosion, in turn,
required increased downtime for maintenance, and this in turn coùtributed to lower
utilization rates on new units.
The arrival of the effective plateau in thermal efficiency in the late 1950s increased
the emphasis on scaling-up of boilers and generators, but by the end of the 1960s this had
also begun to create unanticipated problems. The scale frontier was reached when utilities
discovered that downtime was as much as five times greater for units larger than 600 MW
7.8.
Where no citations are given, specific details in this section are obtained from Hirsch (1989), Chapters
Interview with a plant manager, quoted by Hirsch (1989, p. 93).
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent ("') significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two constructIon-type dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.
All Fuels CoalUsing Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity -0.084" -0.083" -0.078"
2. Log Utilization -0.127" -0.147" -0.104"
3. Relative Price -0.094" -0.163" .0.039"
4. Number Units 0.016" 0.011" 0.024"
5. Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.002" -0.003" -0.002"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.007* * 0.008" 0.002
6. Time
a) All Years -0.008" -0.013" -0.003"
b) 1968-87 0.017" 0.025" 0.007"
7. Fuel Type
a) Coal Using -0.001"
b) Oil Only 0.029" -0.006
c)Gas Only -0.027" -0.018"
0.649 0.516 0.586
Standard Error 0.124 0.130 0.099
Observations 6857 4232 2623Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant 1948-87
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Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (") significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.
frontier that advanced incrementally.For instance, an engineering study in the early
postwar period carried out on units in the range of 50-100 KW stated: "we have every
confidence that continued progress in metallurgy and design skill will make units larger than
those now in operation economically feasible" (Kirchmayer e. aL, 1955, p. 609). One of the
conference discussants of the same study stated that "size must not run ahead of our proved
progress in metallurgy. From recent evidence it seems that size has now outrun progress"
(p. 613).Hirsch emphasizes metallurgy, and attributes advances in size, pressure, and
temperature in the early postwar years to "advances in metallurgical knowledge gained
during the war and used in aircraft and artillery . . . newly developed 'super alloy' steels that
resisted metal fatigue and cracking, for example, allowed engineers to design larger
components for more power output" (1989, p. 89-90).Thus the engineering literature
appears to support the technological hypothesis over the market hypothesis as the primary
source of scale economies achieved prior to 1970.
Technology "Hits the Wall"
Until World War Il the traditional approach in achieving improvements in scale and
efficiency had been the "design-by-experience" approach in which each step to a new
technological plateau was followed by a period of debugging before the next advance
occurred. In the postwar period, spurred by the rapidly growing demand for electricity,
equipment manufacturers shifted to a more aggressive philosophy called "design-by-
extrapolation" in which the next advance was planned before operating experience had
All Fuels Coal Using Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity 0.539" 0.554" 0.453"
2. Log Utilization 0.120" 0.051" 0.032"
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.219" 0.186" 0.508"
4. Number Units 0.061" 0.060" 0.073"
5. Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.015' * -0.014" -0.011"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.032" 0.031" -0.012"
6. Time
a) All Years -0.027" -0.029" -0.024"
b) 1968-87 0.047" 0.053" 0.032"
7. Fuel Type
a) Coal Using -0.004"
b) Oil Only -0.188"
e) Gas Only -0.213" -0.115"
0.782 0.792 0.788
Standard Error 0.373 0.357 0.3 12
Observations 6674 4181 2491Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 8
technical improvements 'scale augmenting technical change.'4
The end of the era of increasing size helps to explain the productivity slowdown, and
so it is important to determine whether the sources of the previous growth in scale had
primarily been technological advance or the increasing size of the market. The technologi-
cal hypothesis emphasizes the incremental advance of technology toward a technical ceiling
reached in the late 1960s, at the beginning of the slowdown period. In contrast the market
hypothesis stresses the role of higher energy prices in the 1970s in reducing the growth in
demand for electricity, and predicts that further advances in scale should resume in response
to the post-1983 decline in the real price of electricity.
One way to distinguish the two hypotheses is to ask why generator units were so small
in the early part of the postwar period. Either manufacturers did not have the technical
competence to produce larger units at reasonable cost, or markets were too small to support
the purchase of larger units. One indirect piece of evidence that supports the technological
explanation is that the average number of units installed per newly constructed plant during
the 1947-50 period was 2.0, and six plants in our data set were built with three or four units
during that interval. If larger pieces of equipment had been available at a lower cost per
unit of capacity, they would have been purchased in place of two or more of the smaller
units.
Numerous commentaries attribute the gradual increase in scale to a technological
4. As Wills illustrates (1978, p. 500), there is little further improvement in thermal efficiency as unit sizes
increase beyond 250 megawatts. Indeed, after increasing from 3 percent in 1880 to 22 percent in 1947, thermal
efficiency leveled off at about 33 percent in the late 1950s and showed no change after than (Hirsch, 1989, Figure
1, p. 4).
TABLE 7
Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant with Vintage Averaging, 1948-87
All Fuels Coal Using Noncoal Using
(1) (2) (3)
1. Log Capacity 0.580" 0.592" 0.450"
2. Log Utilization 0.088' * 0.082" 0.024
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.074 0.004 0.402"
4. Number Units 0.061' 0.067" 0.066"
5. Average Vintage
a) All Vintages -0.030" -0.026" -0.026"
b) 1968-87 Shift 0.049" 0.047" -0.014"
6. Time
a) All Years .0.014" .0.019" -0.011'
b) 1968-87 0.036" 0.045" 0.023"
7. Fuel
a) Coal Using .0.343"
b) Oil Only -0.065" -0.058"
c) Gas Only .0.051' * -0.112"
0.802 0.805 0.790
Standard Error 0.359 0.357 0313
Observations 5031 3036 1996
Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (') significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two coostruction-tWe dummy
variables, as well as a constant term.Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
by Plant over Split Sample Periods,
1948-67 and 1968.87
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Notes: Asterisks indicate 5 percent (') or 1 percent (**) significance levels.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy
variables, as weU as a constant term.
Technology and the Sources of Economies of Scale
Until the late 1960s technical change in the design of BTG units was aimed primarily
at increasing the size of generators and boilers, and at improving the thermal efficiency of
the generating cycle by increasing the temperature to which the steam is heated, increasing
the pressure of the steam entering the turbine, and reducing the heat which is transferred
out of the cycle in the condenser. The technical design frontier was limited by the ability
of boilers to withstand high temperatures and pressures, and the frontier was pushed out by
incremental advances, particularly in metallurgy involving the development of high
temperature steel alloys. Most of the shift to higher temperatures and to reheat cycles was
completed during the 1948-57 decade, with little fbrther change thereafter, whereas the
increase in pressure rating continued until the late 1960s.
The average scale of BTG units also increased, with 58 percent of new units rated
below 50 megawatts in 1948, and 60 percent above 500 megawatts in 1987. The increase
in scale proceeded steadily through the mid-1970s and then ceased. Increased scale was
interdependent with improved thermal efficiency, since many of the efficiency improvements
required greater capital expenditures, the expense of which could be partially offset by
increased scale.3 Cowing (1970) has dubbed this interaction between increasing scale and
3. Engineers use a 'six-tenth? rule for approximating the additional cost of a capacity increase, je., a one
percent increase in capacity increases capital cost by 0.6 percent, reflecting the geometrical fact that a one
percent increase in the volume of a sphere increases its surface area by about 0.6 percent (Moore,1959).
Coal Using Noncoal Using
1948-67 1968.87 1948-67 1968.87
1. Log Capacity 0.541" 0.665' * 0.409" 0.522' *
2. Log Utili7tion .0.080* 0.150" 0.001 0.022
3. Heat Rate 0.674* * -0.058 0.861" 0.260
Residual
4. Units 0.083" 0.053" 0.089" 0.059"
5. Average Vintage
a. All Vintages.0()28" .O()29" -0016" -0.029"




-0.013" 0.027" -0.012" -0.012"
7. Fuel
a. Coal Using
b. Oil Only 0.025 0.057'
C. Gas Only -0.147" -0.116"
0.834 0.763 0.837 0.762
Standard Error 0.287 0.373 0.236 0.330
Observations 984 2049 511 1484Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 6
utility industiy.2
The production process involves the transformation of the internal energyin a fuel
source into electrical energy. A power generation"unit" operates independently of any other
units at a given plant location and consists of a boiler to burn the fueland to generate and
expand the steam, and a turbo-generator which converts high-pressure steaminto electric
energy through the rotaiy motion of a turbineshaft. A condensor converts the steam into
water to complete the cycle. The entire unit is called a"boiler-turbo-generator", or BTG
unit. A central measure of the efficiency of this transformation processis the "heat rate"
(HR) of the cycle, the ratio of input in British thermal units (Btu) to onekilowatt-hour
HR.BTU input (1)
KWH output
Thus the higher the heat rate, the more fuel is being consumedin the production of a given
amount of electricity, and the less efficient isthe generation process. The heat rate moves
inversely to a companion ratio called "thermal efficiency."
2. This verdict is qualified by Hirsch (1989, p.71), who argues that 'to explain progressin electric power
technològy simply as a result of research and development performed by manufacturers wouldbe one-sided and
misleadin&" The other side of technical advance is achieved by utility management, 67 percentof which in 1964
consisted of trained engineers. Managers in particular companiesperceived themselves ascompeting for the role
of technological leadership and constantly pressed equipment manufacturers to achievetechnical advances, taking
the risk that unproved technology would be successfuL However, this role of managementis not counted as
research and development (R&D) by normal accounting methods, and Hirschhimself reports that utility-funded
R&D in 1970 amounted to only 0.23 percent of gross revenues.
TABLE 9
Average Heat and Utilization Rates
by Fuel Type, Selected Intervals,

















I. Heat Rate 123 103 10.0 9.8 10.0 10.4 10.6 10.6
a. Coal Using 123 10.4 9.9 9.5 9.9 10.5 10.5 10.6
b. Oil Only 11.6 103 10.1 9.2 9.3 10.0 10.9
c. Gas Only 12.7 11.6 10.5 103 10.2 10.5 10.7 --
2. Utilization
Rate 65.1 60.6 64.6 61.7 48.4 42.1 44.5 41.5
a. Coal Using 66.8 56.1 66.9 63.7 47.4 47.3 48.4 41.5
b. Oil Only 65.6 50.7 563 68.7 52.4 34.4 18.8
c. Gas Only 66.7 61.9 553 58.9 46.6 38.0 57.1Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
With Interaction Effects, Coal-Using Plants,
1948-87
TABLE 10 Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 5
Noies: Astcrislcs indicate 5 percent () or 1 percent (") significance levcls.
All equations also include five location dummy variables and two construction-type dummy variablcs, as
well as a constant tCrm.
However, as we shall see the problems of the industiy go far beyond those that can be
attributed to maturity alone. A third qualification is that our data set, while it has the great
advantage that the majority of generating plants can be identified by vintage and observed
over a long period of time, lacks particular explanatory variables that have become
important during the productivity slowdoi period, especially measures of technical
characteristics like pressure, temperature, and the presence of scrubbers and cooling stacks.
Other data sets, e.g., that of Joskow and Rose (1985), are complementary, having the
advantage of including many of the technology variables needed to study the effects of
environmental regulation, but lacking the advantage in our data set of the ability to observe
a given establishment over a long period of time.
iii. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Characteristics of the Technology
Although electric utilities are monopolists in the local markets they serve, the
aggregate number of these individual monopolies is substantial, in contrast to the very small
number of major producers of generating equipment. Thus utilities can accurately be
described as price takers in the market for new equipment, and they also are 'quality takers
in the sense that their choice set is constrained by whatever price-quality combinations are
offered by equipment manufactures on the market at any given time.Research and










(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Log Capacity 0.592" 0.700" 0.705" 0.623"
2. Log Utilization 0.082" 0.067 0.105" -0.007
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.004 -0.224 -0.174" -0.294"
4. Number of Units 0.067" 0.069" 0.069" 0.062"
5. Average Vintage
a. All -0.026" -0.080" -0.082" -0.056"
b. 1968-87 Shift 0.047" 0.183" 0.186" 0.193"
c.1'5a(VCAP) 0.009" 0.009" 0.004"
d. 1Sb (VSCAP) -0.020" -0.022" -0.022"
e. 2 ' 5a (VUT) -0.001
f. 2' 5b (VSUT) 0.013
g. 3Sa (VHR) -0.006
h. 3Sb (VSHR) 0.122' 0.119" 0.074"
6. Time
a. All -0.019" -0.014" -0.013 -0.011"
b. 1968-87 Shift 0.045" 0.038" 0.038" -0.012
c. 1 ' 6b (TSCAP) 0.009"
d. 2 * 6b (TSUTIL) 0.013"
e. 36b (TSHR) 0.039"
0.805 0.811 0.811 0.815
Standard Error 0357 0.351 0351 0348
Observations 3036 3036 3036 3036Productivity In Electricity Generation, Page 4
rapid increase in the relative price of electricity.
Scope of the Study
This paper limits its attention to the production of electricity in steam plants using
fossil fuels.Electricity makes up about 70 percent of the "electricity, gas, and sanitary
services" industry aggregate in the NIPA, fossil-fuel steam accounts for almost three-quarters
of electricity generation (the rest is mainly hydro and nuclear), and employees involved in
generation make up about one-third of all employees on the payrolls of electric utilities.
Despite the relatively small fraction of total utility employment covered, the industry
segment analyzed in this paper has experienced a slowdown in productivity growth very
similar to that of the utility industry aggregate, as shown in Table 3. Here growth rates are
computed over intervals between three-year averages of levels to smooth year-to-year
variation in our sample of plants. Productivity growth in our sample of generating plants
decelerates somewhat faster than the BLS index for the electric utility industry through
1978-80 but was almost identical to the BLS index in the last interval through 1985-87.
Limitations
While the electric generating industry is appealing as a subject for study, our
regressions cover an extremely small fraction of U. S. employment and bear on only a smnll
fraction of the total U. S. productivity growth puzzle. A second qualification is that the
electric utility industry has entered a relatively "mature" phase of the industry growth cycle,
and thus it may not be surprising that its productivity growth would decline over time.
TABLE 11
Sources of Productivity Growth,
All Coal-Using Plants, By Decade
Annual Percentage Rates of Change,









A. Actual 8.23 4.75 -1.88 -035
B. Predicted 10.43 4.78 -1.86 -0.43
C. Contribution of
1. Capacity 3.91 2.71 -2.95 -Ois
a. Effect on Output 10.94 8.94 5.11 632
b. Minus Capacity Effect on Employment -6.82 -5.57 -3.18 -4.06
Minus VCAP & VSCAP Effects on Employment.0.21 .0.66 0.89 4.10
d. Minus TSCAP Effect on Employment -5.77 -6.89
2. Utilization 335 -0.45 .1.90 1.43
a. Effect on Output 333 .0.45 -2.83 0.63
b. Minus Utilization Effect on Employment 0.02 -0.00 .0.02 0.00
e. Minus TSUT Effect on Employment 0.95 0.80
3. Heat Rate Residual 0.08 0.22 -0.16 037
a. Minus HR Effect on Employment 0.08 0.22 -0.02 -0.09
b. Minus VSHR Effect on Employment -0.08 0.29
e. Minus TSHR Effect on Employment .0.06 0.17
4. Units .033 .0.14 0.05 -0.21
5. Average Vintage 2.90 2.75 031 -2.09
a. Basic Effect 2.90 2.75 3.58 330
b. 1968.87 Shift .3.07 -539
6. Time 1.10 1.10 .0.10 -0.10
a. Basic Effect 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
b. 1968-87 Shift -1.20 -1.20
7. Dummy Variables and Other 43.38 .1.41 2.69 050TABLE 12
Equations Explaining the Log of Employment
Allowing for the Establishment and Finn Effects
Unedited Sample for Coal Using Plants, 1948-87
Equation with Equation with
Baiic Establishment Establishment and
Ecuation Effects and Firm Effects
'Within"'Between" "Within'"Detw. Estab." 'Betw. Firm'
Effect (p)Effect (#) Effect (fi)Effect (#)Effect (0)
Note:Asterisks Indicate 5 percent () or 1 percent (") significance levels. Ail equations also include five location dummy
variables and two construction4ype dummy variables, as wefl as a constant term.
a. Plants with fewer than two observations were excluded.
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The fact that the real price fell so much more before 1948 than after, while growth in labor
productivity remained fairly steady through 1973, suggests that other factors must have made
a major contribution to the failing real price before 1948, e.g., a decline in the relative price
of fuel and of quality-adjusted capital input. The declining real price of electricity was an
important source of productivity growth in the aggregate economy through the early 1970s,
for historically much technical progress has been labor saving and electricity using
(Jorgenson, 1984).
A closer look at the postwar period is provided in Table 2, which documents the
behavior since 1948 of output and productivity in the public utility sector as defined in the
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA), and in the electric utility portion of the
utility sector. Also shown is the relative price of electricity. The top half of the table
displays levels of variables, and the bottom half displays annual rates of growth over five
year intervals.
Real GNP growth in the utility sector was most rapid before 1953, reached a plateau
between 1953 and 1973, almost ceased between 1973 and 1983, and then revived after 1983.
The slowdown in labor productivity growth in the sector began earlier than that of output,
and productivity growth was actually negative on average between 1973 and 1983, followed
by a revival during 1983-88. Productivity growth for electric utilities in column (4) displays
roughly the same pattern as for the utility sector in column (3). The final column shows that
the period of rapid productivity growth coincided with that of a decline in the relative price
of electricity, and the poor productivity decade of 1973-83 coincided with the period of most
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Log Cspacity 0.594" 0.590'"-O3' 0.601" 0.071' 0.101"
2. Log Utilization 0.068" 0.093".0.068 0.077" -0.105'" 0.058
3. Log Heat Rate 0.003" .0.076" 0.559" -0.074 0.739" O3Z
4. Number of
Units 0.066" 0.034 0.041 0.042' .0.012 0.129"
5. Vintage
a) AIl -0.026" -0.026" .0.021"
b) 1968-87 0.046'" 0.047" 0.044
6. Time
a) All Years -0.019"' -0.016" .0.016"
b) 196847 0.046" 0.044"'-.- 0.043"
0.807 0.809 0.827
Standard Error 0356 0.354 0337
Observations 2990' 2990" 2990'utility and environmental regulation, and (3) the econometric literature on production
technology and factor demand in the electric utility industry.
Standard econometric methodology is used except in one respect, the treatment of
outlier observations.Unlike most panel data sets in which the identity of individual
observations is unknown, here it is possible to contact plant managers of individual outlier
establishments and identify important determinants of input demand, thus illuminating the
role of missing variables or mismeasured data. The sulnlnaly of the telephone interviews
represents an important contribution of the research and adds insight that cannot be
provided by the ecönometric coefficient estimates alone.
II. ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE ECONOMYWIDE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN
The electric utility industxy is a prime culprit in the economywide post-1973
productivity growth slowdown. As shown in Table 1, growth in labor productivity (output
per hour) in the electric utility industry proceeded at a rate triple that of the aggregate
economy from 1899 to 1948, and at a rate 2.5 times as fast from 1948 to 1973. After 1973,
however, the previously rapid rate of advance for electric utilities caine screeching to a halt,
as productivity growth slowed to the same low rate as experienced by the aggregate
economy.
Table 1 also displays the growth rate of the real price of electricity over the same
time intervals. Here the rate of improvement decelerated sharply immediately after World

















1982, averages for 1978
17 positive outliers 12 1963 1179 366 126 1.07
12 negative outliers 0 1946 622 96 178 .0.62
Outliers telephoned in
¡990, averages for 1987
15 positive outliers 4 1968 1473 470 224 0.74
15 negative outliers 8 1966 898 70 169 .0.88
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Summary Information on Outlier Plants